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COMMENT: OUT OF THE CLOSET, OUT OF A
JOB: DUE PROCESS IN TEACHER
DISQUALIFICATION
By Jeanne La Borde Scholz*
Introduction
"Out of the closet" has been a rallying cry for gays in recent years.
Unfortunately, for many who act upon this exhortation, coming out of
the closet leads into limbo. The individual who takes that step risks not
only public censure, but also the loss of employment or license to prac-
tice a profession. The threat exists not only for gays who openly ac-
knowledge their sexual orientation and work for political reform and
public acceptance of homosexuality, but also for those whose closet
doors have been unsealed by zealous protectors of the public morality.1
In general, the government may neither deprive an individual of a
valid property interest in employment,2 nor impose a stigma which
forecloses employment opportunities,' for reasons which are arbitrary
and discriminatory.4 Due process entitles an individual to notice and a
hearing when these constitutionally protected interests are threatened.'
Furthermore, public employment may not be conditioned on the sur-
render of constitutional rights, although the government does possess
an interest in regulating the conduct of its employees to further its effi-
ciency.6
Where homosexuality is the basis for dismissal or license revoca-
* J.D., 1979, Hastings College of the Law.
1. Compare, e.g., Gish v. Board of Educ., 145 N.J. Super. 96, 366 A.2d 1337 (1976),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 879 (1977) (teacher's gay activism evidenced deviation from mental
health justifying psychiatric examination and possible dismissal) with Gaylord v. Tacoma
School Dist. No. 10, 88 Wash. 2d 286, 559 P.2d 1340, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 879 (1977)
(teacher for over twelve years whose friends on the faculty did not know he was gay dis-
missed for immorality after a former student reported to the administration his impression
that the teacher was a homosexual).
2. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576-78 (1972).
3. .d. at 573-74.
4. See, e.g., Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 192 (1952). See also Board of Re-
gents v. Roth, 408 U.S. at 589 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
5. Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 542 (1971).
6. Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).
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tion and the individual possesses a valid property interest or has been
stigmatized by the government's action, the reasons for the disqualifica-
tion may appear arbitrary to some yet quite reasonable to others.7 A
review of the case law concerning disqualification of gay employees
reveals the operation of subjective moral attitudes in the decisions of
school boards and reviewing courts.8 Where such personal prejudice
dictates the standard by which an individual is to be judged, this com-
ment suggests that procedural due process has failed to achieve its ob-
jective of guarding against arbitrary and discriminatory governmental
action. Moreover, First Amendment rights of activist gay employees
may be unreasonably "chilled" if embarrassment to the employer9 or
notoriety' ° is held to justify disqualification in the interest of govern-
mental efficiency. Because of the fear that young minds will be ad-
versely influenced., teachers are particularly vulnerable to
disqualification for unorthodox sexual conduct or attitudes;"1 yet a
teacher's affectional preference may have no bearing on his or her com-
petence in the classroom.1 2
The Supreme Court has denied certiorari in numerous cases con-
testing the employment disqualification of gays.' 3 At the same time, its
7. Compare, e.g., Gaylord v. Tacoma School Dist. No. 10, 88 Wash. 2d 286, 559 P.2d
1340, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 879 (1977) with Morrison v. State Bd. of Educ., 1 Cal. 3d 214,
461 P.2d 375, 82 Cal. Rptr. 175 (1969). In Gaylord, a teacher's status as a known homosex-
ual justified dismissal for "immorality" in the eyes of the majority; to the dissenters, how-
ever, the dismissal's basic unfairness violated due process, 88 Wash. 2d at 306, 559 P.2d at
1351 (Dolliver & Utter, JJ., dissenting). The majority in Morrison held that homosexual
conduct could not justify dismissal unless it demonstrated unfitness to teach, but two sepa-
rate dissents saw a rational connection between the acts committed and unfitness, 1 Cal. 3d
214, 247, 251, 461 P.2d 375, 400-01, 403-04, 82 Cal. Rptr. 175, 200, 203 (Sullivan, J., joined
by McComb, J., dissenting) (Burke, J., joined by McComb, J., dissenting).
8. In the words of one court: "Immorality means different things to different people,
and its definition depends on the idiosyncracies of the individual school board members."
Burton v. Cascade School Dist., 353 F. Supp. 254,255 (D. Ore. 1973), affd512 F.2d 850 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 839 (1975).
9. See, e.g., Singer v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 530 F.2d 247 (9th Cir. 1976),
vacated and remanded, 429 U.S. 1034 (1977).
10. See Morrison v. State Bd. of Educ., 1 Cal. 3d 214, 237, 461 P.2d 375, 392, 82 Cal.
Rptr. 175, 192 (1969).
11. For a discussion of the argument that teachers should be held to a higher standard
of conduct than other professionals, see Comment, Unfitness to Teach: Credential.Revocation
and Dismissalfor Sexual Conduct, 61 CAL. L. REv. 1442, 1457-61 (1973).
12. In one case, for example, the teacher had received "consistently favorable" evalua-
tions of his teaching performance over the twelve years he taught high school before his
sexual orientation became known. Gaylord v. Tacoma School Dist. No. 10, 88 Wash. 2d
286, 300, 559 P.2d 1340, 1347 (Dolliver, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 879 (1977).
13. E.g., Burton v. Cascade School Dist., 512 F.2d 850 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
839 (1975); Acanfora v. Board of Educ., 491 F.2d 498 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 836
(1974); McConnell v. Anderson, 451 F.2d 193 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1046
(1972); Gaylord v. Tacoma School Dist. No. 10, 88 Wash. 2d 286, 559 P.2d 1340, cert. de-
nied, 434 U.S. 879 (1977).
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refusal to include private, consensual homosexual acts14 within the am-
bit of the "right to privacy" covering marital15 and some non-marital 6
heterosexual conduct weakens the argument that those who engage in
such conduct should be afforded employment protection. On the other
hand, some states, notably California, have adopted an approach which
attempts to establish whether the unconventional conduct renders an
individual unfit to practice his or her profession. 7 The Civil Service
has progressed even further by issuing regulations safeguarding gay
employees from disqualification solely because of their sexual prefer-
ence or because employment of a homosexual might embarrass the
Service.1 8 It will be contended that this approach is preferable, as it
leaves less room for the operation of subjective values in assessing an
employee's fitness.
California established the requirement of a nexus between homo-
sexuality and occupational fitness for teacher disqualification in the
seminal case of Morrison v. State Board of Education.19 The spirit of
Morrison has been frequently violated,20 however, and the protection it
appears to furnish may evaporate under the heat of majoritarian
prejudices.21 Private, consensual sexual conduct and conduct otherwise
protected under the First Amendment should be accorded legislative
protection; yet this is unlikely to occur because legislatures are more
apt to respond to pressure based on popular sentiment than to the need
for protecting the constitutional rights of an unpopular minority.
14. See Doe v. Commonwealth's Att'y, 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975), aft'dmem.,
425 U.S. 901 (1976) (constitutionality of Virginia's criminal statutes prohibiting sodomy and
oral copulation upheld as applied to private consensual conduct).
15. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
16. See Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977); Planned Parenthood v.
Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
17. Morrison v. State Bd. of Educ., I Cal. 3d 214,461 P.2d 375, 82 Cal. Rptr. 175 (1969).
18. 5 C.F.R. pt. 731, § 731.202(b) (1978).
19. 1 Cal. 3d 214, 461 P.2d 375, 82 Cal. Rptr. 175 (1969).
20. See, e.g., Newland v. Board of Governors, 19 Cal. 3d 705, 714 n.11, 566 P.2d 254,
259 n.11, 139 Cal. Rptr. 620, 625 n.l1 (1977) (Supreme Court rejected defendant Board's
argument that teacher convicted ten years earlier of an act of masturbation in a closed toilet
stall in a bus station was unfit to teach as a matter of law); Board of Educ. v. Millette, 133
Cal. Rptr. 275 (1976), vacated sub non Board of Educ. v. Jack M., 19 Cal. 3d 691, 566 P.2d
602, 139 Cal. Rptr. 700 (1977) (teacher's alleged solicitation of homosexual act in a public
restroom viewed by court of appeal as demonstrating unfitness to teach as a matter of law);
Pettit v. State Bd. of Educ., 10 Cal. 3d 29, 513 P.2d 889, 109 Cal. Rptr. 665 (1973) (extramar-
ital sexual acts at a "swinger's" party evidenced teacher's unfitness to teach principles of
morality to retarded children).
21. The strength and nature of these prejudices is evidenced by California Proposition
6, General Election, November 7, 1978, which provided for filing charges against school
employees for "advocating, soliciting, imposing, encouraging or promoting private or pub-
lie" homosexual acts "in a manner likely to come to the attention of other employees or
students." Ballot Pamp., Proposed Amends. to Cal. Const. with arguments to voters, Gen.
Elec. (Nov. 7, 1978), p. 29. This initiative was, however, defeated.
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This comment contends that state supreme courts, if afforded the
opportunity to consider the issue, should recognize the constitutional
dimensions of disqualification of homosexual teachers and other em-
ployees and delineate areas of protection under their state constitu-
tions. Part I outlines the contours of due process in employment
disqualification cases established by the United States Supreme Court.
In Part II, substantive standards applicable to the disqualification of
homosexual employees, as developed in federal and state courts and by
the Civil Service, will be explored. Part III will discuss how these stan-
dards are applied, the problems inherent in their application and what
results have been obtained. Finally, in Part IV, considerations leading
toward more objective standards of due process applicable to gay
teachers will be discussed. It will be concluded that the state constitu-
tion is a proper, and perhaps necessary, basis for protecting teachers
and other employees from dismissal or license revocation due to sexual
orientation.
I. Constitutional Protection for Public Employees
A. Procedural Due Process
Under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, an individual's in-
terest in public employment has emerged as constitutionally pro-
tected.22 Because procedural fairness must be observed whenever
disqualification of a public employee threatens a liberty or property
interest,23 due process entitles the individual to notice of the reasons for
denial of government employment and an opportunity for a hearing on
disputed issues of fact.24 The aim of these procedures is to insure that
government action is not arbitrary or capricious, 25 but because a liberty
or property interest is required before any process becomes due, such
governmental action may be allowed to stand if the existence of a pro-
tectable interest is not established. Since the Supreme Court has nar-
rowed the concept of both liberty and property interests, procedural
due process has been held to be unnecessary in many instances. More-
over, even when some form of hearing is mandated, a full-scale
pretermination hearing is not always constitutionally required. For
22. U.S. CONST. amend. V: "No person shall.., be deprived of life, liberty, or prop-
erty, without due process of law. .. ." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1: "[Nior shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without due process of law; nor deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
23. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573-74 (1972).
24. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 601-03 (1972).
25. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 589 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting): "[I]t is
procedural due process that is our fundamental guarantee of fairness, our protection against
arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable government action."
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some employees, procedural due process is thus but a hollow guaran-
tee.
1. Liberty
A liberty interest may be infringed when the state imposes a
stigma or other disability that forecloses one's freedom to take advan-
tage of other employment opportunities.26 In Board of Regents v.
Roth,27 the conditions that would impose a stigma were expressed as "a
charge. . . that [the employee] had been guilty of dishonesty, or im-
morality."28 Roth, hired to reach for one year, was informed that he
would not be rehired but was given no explanation. He alleged that the
true reason for his non-retention was his criticism of the university ad-
ministration and contended that the university must provide some jus-
tification for its actions. The Court held that no liberty interest was
implicated in Roth because no such charges had been made and no
regulations had been invoked to bar Roth from public employment at
other state universities; therefore he need not be afforded a hearing.29
Similarly, in Cafeteria Workers Local 473 v. McElroy,3" the denial of a
hearing was upheld when a cook at a naval gun factory was discharged
for her failure to gain a security clearance. The Court stated that her
removal had imposed no "badge of disloyalty or infamy"31 and that
she was free to obtain employment elsewhere.
In addition to the imposition of a stigma, public disclosure of the
reasons for an employee's discharge is a prerequisite to finding a depri-
vation of liberty. Thus, in Bishop v. Wood,32 a policeman who had
been dismissed based upon charges which he claimed were false could
not claim infringement of a liberty interest because the reasons for his
dismissal were communicated in private.33 Absent public disclosure,
no injury to the employee's reputation was inflicted by the government.
The boundaries of the liberty interest were also tightened in Paul v.
Davis.34 The Court there held that damage to reputation alone does
26. Id. at 573 (majority opinion).
27. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
28. Id. at 573.
29. Id. The thrust of the Court's holding is that no reason for dismissal or nonretention
need be given if an employee does not possess a protected property interest. See note 42 and
accompanying text infra.
30. 367 U.S. 886 (1961).
31. Id. at 898.
32. 426 U.S. 341 (1976).
33. Id. at 348-49. See also Codd v. Velger, 429 U.S. 624, 628 (1977) (per curiam) (em-
ployer must create and disseminate a false and defamatory impression in order for employee
to merit a hearing).
34. 424 U.S. 693 (1976). The petitioner in Paul contended that police officers had im-
posed a stigma upon his reputation by circulating a flyer to local merchants that falsely
designated him as an "active shoplifter."
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not deprive an individual of protected liberty; rather, it must be cou-
pled with deprivation of some other tangible interest, such as a loss of
public employment, in order to invoke procedural protection. 35 If an
employee's reputation is thereby imperiled, he would be entitled to no-
tice of the charges and a hearing for the purpose of proving them un-
true and clearing his name, although the prospective employer would
remain free to deny employment for other legitimate reasons.36
The requirement that these three factors-imposition of a stigma,
public disclosure of the reasons for the discharge and deprivation of a
tangible interest above and beyond damage to reputation-be present
has thus reduced the number of instances when an employee can claim
a right to procedural due process. In a manner similar to the Court's
approach to liberty interests, the concept of what constitutes a property
interest has also been limited.
2 Property
To trigger due process protections, a property interest must be
more than "an abstract need or desire" 37 or a "unilateral expectation 38
of a benefit. Whether a sufficient claim of entitlement to continued
state employment exists is controlled by state law.39 Thus, where a
teacher has been granted tenure under state law, he or she may not be
summarily dismissed without notice and a hearing.40 In Slochower v.
Board of Higher Education,4' the Court held that a tenured teacher
who had exercised his privilege against self-incrimination during a
Senate hearing could not be discharged without a hearing, even though
a state statute provided for automatic termination of tenure in such
cases, because such summary action unconstitutionally deprived the
teacher of a property interest. In contrast, no protected property inter-
est was found in Board of Regents v. Roth42 because his one-year con-
tract made no provision for renewal.
The Court in Roth reiterated, however, that individuals who had
been dismissed during the terms of their contracts or who could show a
clearly implied promise of continued employment are entitled to due
process. This dicta is consistent with the decision in Perry v.
35. Id. at 701.
36. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573 n.12 (1972).
37. Id. at 577.
38. Id.
39. Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 344-47 (1976). See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S.
254, 261-62 (1970) (statute defining welfare eligibility held to create a property interest);
Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 192 (1952) (contract created entitlement).
40. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576-77 (1972).
41. 350 U.S. 551 (1956).
42. 408 U.S. 564, 578 (1972).
43. Id. at 577 (quoting Connell v. Higginbotham, 403 U.S. 207, 208 (1971)).
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Sindermann,4 wherein the Court ruled that a teacher who had held his
faculty position for four years in reliance upon a de facto tenure provi-
sion could establish a legitimate claim of entitlement. The Court cau-
tioned, though, that "[i]f it is the law [of the state] that a teacher in the
respondent's position has no contractual or other claim to job tenure,
the respondent's claim would be defeated." 45 Therefore, if a state's em-
ployees hold their positions at the will and pleasure of their employer,
they may be dismissed without a hearing. In those cases, the only re-
striction on the public employer's action is that it not be "motivated by
a desire to curtail or to penalize the exercise of an employee's constitu-
tionally protected rights ....
3. The Right to Notice and a Hearing
Once an employee has established the existence of a sufficient lib-
erty or property interest, he or she is entitled to notice and a hearing to
determine the adequacy of cause for dismissal.47 While notice must
include the reasons for the termination and the procedure to be fol-
lowed for protesting it,48 due process does not require a full evidentiary
hearing in every case.49 The extent of the process which is due instead
depends on a balancing of the government's interest in expeditious re-
moval of an employee whose conduct hinders the efficiency of public
service against the weight of the property interest possessed by the em-
ployee, taking into account the seriousness and permanence of the
threatened loss. 50
A pretermination, adversary-type hearing was not required in Ar-
nett v. Kennedy5 1 because an act of Congress authorized dismissal
solely for "cause" and mandated an evidentiary hearing only upon ap-
peal, with the proviso that a wrongfully discharged employee would
44. 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
45. Id. at 602 n.7.
46. Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341,350 (1976). But see Mount Healthy City School Dist.
v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977) (even where plaintiff establishes that constitutionally protected
conduct was a motivating factor in a decision not to rehire, reinstatement will be denied if
the board can establish by a preponderance of evidence that it would have reached the same
decision in absence of violation of a constitutional right). For criticism of Supreme Court
decisions limiting due process protection of property and liberty interests, see Van Alstyne,
Cracks in "The New Properq' ' Adjudicative Due Process in the Administrative State, 62
CORNELL L. REv. 445 (1977).
47. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 166 (1974) (Powell, J., joined by Blackmun, J.,
concurring in part and concurring with the result in part). But see note 36 and accompany-
ing text supra.
48. Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1978).
49. Cafeteria Workers Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 894 (1961).
50. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 167-68 (1974) (Powell, J., joined by Blackmun, J.,
concurring in part and concurring with the result in part).
51. 416 U.S. 134 (1974).
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receive full back pay if reinstated.52 The balance in Arnell was tipped
in favor of the government's "substantial" interest in prompt removal
of an unsatisfactory employee, which was found to outweigh the tem-
porary deprivation of income Arnett would suffer if he prevailed on the
merits on appeal. 3 In addition, pretermination procedures, although
not full-scale hearings, were found to minimize the risk of error in re-
moval decisions.5 ' Although a majority of the Court agreed that gov-
ernmental discretion to determine whether an employee's conduct
interferes with its operation must be exercised fairly and reasonably to
comport with constitutional due process requirements, the Court split
as to the weight to be accorded competing interests in determining what
procedures were necessary. In his concurring opinion, Justice Powell
emphasized the government's interest in maintaining discipline and ef-
ficiency;55 the dissenters, on the other hand, emphasized the impor-
tance of the employee's interest in retaining his or her job, and viewed
a temporary suspension of income as a significant loss, meriting more
procedural protection than was afforded.5 6
52. Lloyd-LaFollette Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 5596, 7501 (a) (1976); 5 C.F.R. § 771.208 (1978).
Arnett, a nonprobationary employee of the Office of Economic Opportunity, had his em-
ployment terminated after he publicly accused superiors of offering bribes of federal funds
to a community organization if the organization would sign a statement against Arett. The
accusations were allegedly false and resulted in his removal "for such cause as will promote
the efficiency of the service." 5 U.S.C. § 7501 (a) (1976). The dissenters in Arnett argued
that the efficiency of the service standard would permit dismissal for even truthful criticism
of an agency. 416 U.S. 134, 229 (1974) (Marshall, J., joined by Douglas & Brennan, J.J.,
dissenting).
53. Three members of the Court, Justice Rehnquist, the author of the plurality opinion,
Chief Justice Burger and Justice Stewart, believed that a state statute or act of Congress
which confers a property interest in employment and also specifies procedural limitations on
the type of hearing required should be viewed as procedurally adequate. The plurality opin-
ion stated: "[A] litigant in [Arnett's position] must take the bitter with the sweet." 416 U.S.
at 154. Justices Powell and Blackmun, however, noted that procedural due process is a
constitutional guarantee, not a matter of legislative grace as suggested by the plurality, but
agreed that Arnett had received appropriate procedural protection. 416 U.S. at 166-67, 169-
70 (Powell, J., joined by Blackmun, J., concurring in part and concurring in the result).
54. 416 U.S. at 154-55. The act required that an employee be given 30 days advance
written notice with an opportunity to respond to the charges and appear before the official
who was authorized to make the removal decision. 5 U.S.C. § 5596 (1976); 5 C.F.R.
§§ 771.208, 772.305 (1978). Compliance with the act created an irony in Amett's situation
because the official authorized to remove Arnett was the director he had allegedly slandered.
416 U.S. at 155 n.21. A majority of the Court, however, did not perceive a need for an
impartial decision-maker. 416 U.S. at 155-56 n.12, 170 n.5 (Powell, J., joined by Blackmun,
J., concurring in the result).
55. 416 U.S. at 168 (Powell, J., joined by Blackmun, J., concurring in part and concur-
ring in the result in part).
56. Id. at 218-27 (Marshall, J., joined by Douglas & Brennan, JJ., dissenting). Justice
Marshall also pointed out that almost one-fourth of all appeals from agency dismissals re-
sult in a finding that the termination was illegal. Id. at 218-19. Justice White generally
agreed with Justice Powell's analysis, but believed that an impartial decision-maker was
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By tightening the boundaries of what constitutes a liberty or prop-
erty interest and eliminating any obligation to provide a full-scale, pre-
termination hearing, the decisions in Roth, Bishop, Davis and Arnett
offer little assurance to the employee who does not satisfy the prerequi-
sites set forth therein. Even if he or she does meet these judicial re-
quirements, procedural due process merely guarantees a hearing; it
does not insure that the individual will be reinstated absent compelling
or even important reasons for his or her removal. 7 An employee's
right to substantive due process, on the other hand, guarantees that his
or her dismissal will not be based on arbitrary or capricious grounds.
This substantive component of due process will be discussed in the next
section.
B. Substantive Due Process
The idea of what constitutes "fair" cause for disqualification con-
sistent with substantive due process has not been adequately developed
by the Supreme Court. While it may be assumed that removal on ra-
cial, ethnic or religious grounds would be unconstitutionally arbi-
trary,58 the propriety of removal based on a teacher's homosexuality is
less clear due to societal myths which equate homosexuality with in-
competency to be a schoolteacher. Moreover, courts are often reluctant
to substitute their judgment for that of legislative and administrative
tribunals, thus leaving to them the question of when the dismissal of a
gay teacher is constitutionally "fair."5 9
required. Id. at 196-99 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). But see note 54
supra.
57. Some interests which merit procedural due process are considered "fundamental,"
and statutes impinging on those interests thus require a greater showing of justification than
the ordinary "rational basis" test. See, e.g., Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337,
342 (1969) (statute permitting garnishment of wages without notice and hearing violated due
process property rights); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (antimiscegenation statute
violated due process liberty interest in right to marry). Most statutes touching on liberty or
property rights, however, must demonstrate only a rational connection between the regula-
tion and a legitimate state interest. See, e.g., Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238 (1976) (regula-
tion of length and style of policemen's hair bore rational relation to organization of police
force and promotion of safety); Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974) (zoning
regulation restricting land use to one-family dwellings housing not more than two unrelated
individuals bore a rational relation to community interest in encouraging family values).
But see Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (ordinance which effectively pre-
vented two cousins from residing with their grandmother arbitrarily infringed on the institu-
tion of the family, a basic traditional value deserving of greater constitutional protection).
58. In analyzing the dismissal of a teacher when his homosexual status became known,
a dissenting justice queried: "What if Mr. Gaylord's status was as a black, a Roman Catho-
lic, or a young heterosexual single person, instead of a male homosexual? Would his dismis-
sal be handled in such a manner?" Gaylord v. Tacoma School Dist. No. 10, 88 Wash. 2d
286, 305, 559 P.2d 1340, 1350, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 879 (1977) (Dolliver, J., dissenting).
59. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963). Ferguson articulated the Court's
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Homosexual conduct or status may result in employment disquali-
fication through an administrative determination that the employee has
exhibited "immorality" or "moral turpitude. ' 60 Few courts have been
willing to assess the substantive fairness of such determinations, yet dis-
qualification predicated on these reasons alone seems patently arbi-
trary. A teacher who has served competently for years may suddenly
be deemed "unfit" when his or her sexual preference becomes public
knowledge, simply by equating majoritarian moral values with stan-
dards of employment fitness.61 It follows that even if an employee is
entitled to procedural due process, the hearing given may be nothing
more than a formality when such notions of morality underly the appli-
cation of legislative criteria in judging an employee's fitness.6z Thus,
where procedural protections have been observed, many courts avoid
the issue of whether it is fair to use such subjective, value-laden crite-
ria.61 This avoidance, as indicated above, ' may stem from judicial dis-
taste for infringing on legislative or executive prerogatives.
Nevertheless, some courts have confronted this issue and have over-
turned morally-based disqualifications in areas other than homosexual-
ity. For example, courts have found an insufficient connection between
distaste for the "superlegislature"judicial role established in Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S.
45 (1905) and other cases in which state economic regulations were invalidated as infringe-
ments on personal liberty rights. 372 U.S. at 731 (quoting Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Mis-
souri, 342 U.S. 421,423 (1952)). Although reluctance to scrutinize legislative line-drawing is
most obvious in cases where economic decisions are at issue, it may also be observed in the
deferential stance of some courts and justices in other contexts. Justice Rehnquist, for exam-
ple, has frequently criticized the "irrebuttable presumption doctrine" as an attack on legisla-
tive line-drawing. See, e.g., Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441,469 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., joined
by Burger, C.J. & Douglas, J., dissenting) (permanent irrebuttable presumption of nonresi-
dency for tuition purposes struck down). The dissent stated: "The [majority's decision] is
quite inconsistent with doctrines of substantive due process that have obtained in this Court
for at least a decade, and to which I would continue to adhere." See also Cleveland Board
of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 660 (1974) (Rehnquist, J., joined by Burger, C.J., dissent-
ing) (irrebuttable presumption of pregnant teachers' incapacity at a specified stage of preg-
nancy violated due process clause). Justice Rehnquist asserted: 'The Court's
disenchantment with 'irrebuttable presumptions,' and its preference for 'individualized de-
termination,' is in the last analysis nothing less than an attack upon the very notion of law-
making itself." .d. See also Note, The Conclusive Presumption Doctrine: Equal Process or
Due Protection;, 72 MicH. L. REv. 800 (1974).
60. See notes 187-90 and accompanying text infra.
61. See, e.g., Gaylord v. Tacoma School Dist. No. 10, 88 Wash. 2d 286, 559 P.2d 1340,
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 879 (1977).
62. For a discussion of the relationship between substantive due process and cases in-
volving conventional morality, see Perry, Substantive Due Process Revisited: Reflections on
(and Beyond) Recent Cases, 71 Nw. U.L. REv. 417 (1976).
63. See, e.g., McConnell v. Anderson, 451 F.2d 193 (8th Cir. 1971). cert. denied, 405
U.S. 1046 (1972); Schlegel v. United States, 416 F.2d 1372 (Ct. Cl. 1969), cert. denied, 397
U.S. 1039 (1970); McLaughlin v. Board of Medical Examiners, 35 Cal. App. 3d 1010, 111
Cal. Rptr. 353 (1973).
64. See note 59 and accompanying text supra.
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conduct and employment fitness where conviction of a crime barred an
individual from practicing law, 65 an unwed mother from being an ele-
mentary school teacher66 and persons convicted of marijuana posses-
sion from holding certain jobs.67 Yet reviewing courts rarely fail to
find such a nexus when homosexual conduct or status is at issue, per-
haps because of the strength of public opprobrium attached thereto.
In theory, the independence of the judiciary should ensure the pro-
tection of the rights of unpopular minorities-including those of homo-
sexuals. Since one function of the judiciary is to assure that legislative
and administrative procedures comport with due process, there should
be no barrier to judicial assessment of the fairness of any criteria
against which an employee has been measured. As indicated earlier,
procedural due process does not always guarantee a hearing. Nor, as
just demonstrated, has the judiciary adequately defined the role of sub-
stantive due process in such hearings. A third constitutional alterna-
tive, the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions, offers a different, and
perhaps more promising, approach to the problem.
C. Doctrine of Unconstitutional Conditions
Although the government generally has broad discretion to deter-
mine what conduct interferes with the efficiency of public service, the
doctrine of unconstitutional conditions prohibits it from conditioning
employment or receipt of a benefit on the surrender of constitutional
rights. This is particularly relevant with respect to First Amendment
rights, as stated in Perry v. Sindermann:
61
For at least a quarter-century, this Court has made clear that
even though a person has no "right" to a valuable governmental
benefit and even though the government may deny him the bene-
fit for any number of reasons, there are some reasons upon which
the government may not rely. It may not deny a benefit to a per-
son on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected inter-
ests-especially, his interest in freedom of speech.69
While a valid entitlement to continued employment is necessary in
order to trigger procedural due process, it is immaterial where disquali-
fication is predicated on an unconstitutional condition.70 Thus, even
though an employee cannot demonstrate state infringement of a pro-
tected liberty or property interest, if he or she has been disqualified
because of the exercise of constitutional rights, a remedy may be af-
65. Hallinan v. Comm. of Bar Examiners, 65 Cal. 2d 447,421 P.2d 76,55 Cal. Rptr. 228
(1966).
66. Andrews v. Drew Mun. Separate School Dist., 507 F.2d 611 (5th Cir. 1975).
67. Eg., Vielehr v. State Personnel Bd., 32 Cal. App. 3d 187, 107 Cal. Rptr. 852 (1973).
68. 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
69. Id. at 597.
70. Id. at 597-98.
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forded.7" The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions may be particu-
larly applicable when gay employees are dismissed for off-duty
activities aimed at educating the public and working for political and
social reforms. The limits on permissible governmental regulation of
its employees' conduct imposed by this doctrine are explored below.
1. Parameters of the Doctrine
Although public employment may not be conditioned on the sur-
render of First Amendment rights,72 public employees may be treated
differently as a class in their exercise of these rights. This stems from
the premise that the state "has interests as an employer in regulating
the speech of its employees that differ significantly from those it pos-
sesses in connection with regulation of the speech of the citizenry in
general."7 3 The Hatch Act,7 4 for example, which prohibits federal em-
ployees from taking an active part in political campaigns, was upheld
in United States Civil Service Commission v. NationalAssociation of Let-
7 1. In analyzing a condition on employment, a court may scrutinize a statute for vague-
ness or overbreadth, attempting to determine whether the government's action serves an
important purpose which cannot be achieved through less drastic means. A statute is vague
on its face if its terms are so ambiguous that a person of common intelligence cannot deter-
mine what conduct is prohibited. See Papachristou v. Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972).
Courts will generally construe, rather than invalidate, vague civil statutes. See, e.g., Morri-
son v. State Bd. of Educ., 1 Cal. 3d 214, 461 P.2d 375, 82 Cal. Rptr. 175 (1969). If a statute
restricts speech, however, it will be susceptible to a vagueness challenge because of the value
placed on free expression and the danger of chilling protected speech. See, e.g., Coates v.
Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971); Cramp v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 368 U.S. 278 (1961). A
statute authorizing dismissal of public school teachers for "treasonable or seditious" utter-
ances was held unconstitutionally vague in Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589
(1967).
Regulations may be held overbroad if the governmental interest is not substantial, if the
means employed bear little relation to the interest sought to be protected or if the purpose
could be achieved by less drastic means. See Israel, El/brandt v. Russell: The Demise of the
Oath?, 1966 Sup. CT. REv. 193, 217-19. See generally Note, Less Drastic Means and The
First Amendment, 78 YALE L.J. 464 (1969). The Court in Keylshlan also held statutes which
barred employment to members of listed organizations to be impermissibly overbroad be-
cause "membership without a specific intent to further the unlawful aims of an organization
is not a constitutionally adequate basis for exclusion." 385 U.S. at 606. An Arkansas statute
which required teachers to disclose annually all organizational affiliations was held over-
broad in Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960). The Court reasoned that the state's pur-
pose of ascertaining the fitness of teachers could be achieved through narrower means,
minimizing the danger that public pressure might cause school boards to "discharge teachers
who belong to unpopular or minority organizations." 364 U.S. at 486-87. But cf. Acanfora
v. Board of Educ., 491 F.2d 498 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 836 (1974) (teacher's omis-
sion of his membership in a gay rights organization named "Homophiles of Penn. State"
was held to constitute misrepresentation sufficient to bar him from standing to challenge the
constitutionality of his disqualification). See notes 235 & 236 and accompanying text infra.
72. See notes 68 & 69 and accompanying text supra.
73. Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).
74. 5 U.S.C. §§ 7321-7327 (1976).
[Vol. 6:663
ter Carriers.75 The Court maintained that the Act served important
governmental interests in limiting corruption, improper influence and
coercion of employees, and in avoiding erosion of public confidence in
the system of representative government.76 The majority deferred to
congressional and executive judgment that narrower prohibitions
would not achieve the desired result.77
Letter Carriers permitted an extremely broad Congressional con-
dition on public employment to stand, but the more recent decision in
Elrod v. Burns78 indicates that the government must justify any re-
straint of an individual's First Amendment rights by establishing a
compelling interest which cannot be furthered by less drastic means.
Elrod held that patronage dismissals-conditioning employment on
political partisan support-from non-policymaking jobs were unconsti-
tutional. The Court stated that such conditions must survive "exacting
scrutiny" 79 the government must demonstrate the existence of a para-
mount interest which outweighs the restriction of an individual's con-
stitutionally protected rights and that the means chosen are the least
restrictive of the individual's protected interests.8" Since political loy-
alty did not, in the Court's view, ensure more efficient service to the
employer, there was not a sufficient connection between the govern-
ment's interest and infringement of individual rights." Furthermore,
any legitimate interest in employing individuals who would whole-
heartedly implement policies could be satisfied by employing the less
drastic means of limiting dismissals to policymaking personnel.8 2
The trend toward requiring more than a rational basis to justify a
teacher's dismissal for exercising First Amendment rights was initiated
in Pickering v. Board of Education.83 Pickering was dismissed from his
teaching position for criticizing school board financial policies in a let-
ter containing erroneous statements of fact published in the local pa-
per. 4 His dismissal was upheld by the lower courts, but the Supreme
Court reversed. The Court balanced the interests of the teacher in
commenting upon matters of public concern against those of the state
in promoting the efficiency of the public service.85 The interest of the
75. 413 U.S. 548 (1973).
76. Id. at 565.
77. Id. at 566-67. The dissenters, however, noted the "chilling effect of [the Act's] vague
and generalized prohibitions" and the irrelevancy of political creed to an employee's job
performance. Id. at 596-97 (Douglas, J., joined by Brennan & Marshall, JJ., dissenting).
78. 427 U.S. 347 (1976).
79. Id. at 362.
80. Id. at 363.
81. Id. at 364-66.
82. Id. at 367.
83. 391 U.S. 563, 567-68 (1968).
84. Id. at 564, 566-67.
85. Id. at 568.
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school administration did not outweigh the teacher's interest in free ex-
pression because the statements were "neither shown nor can be pre-
sumed to have in any way either impeded the teacher's proper
performance of his daily duties in the classroom or to have interfered
with the regular operation of the schools generally. '' "o The require-
ment of a nexus between a teacher's conduct and job or school effi-
ciency might be met, the Court suggested, if the statements violated an
express need for confidentiality, disrupted a necessary close working
relationship or evidenced a teacher's general lack of competence.8 7 But
nonretention of a public employee in reprisal for the exercise of First
Amendment rights, such as public criticism of an employee's superiors
on a matter of public concern, is impermissible, as reiterated four years
later in Perry.18
These cases demonstrate that the level of scrutiny employed by the
reviewing court is extremely important in determining whether a
teacher's dismissal effectively operates as an unconstitutional condition,
especially when a teacher has been dismissed for advocating an unor-
thodox cause such as gay rights. "Exacting scrutiny," as employed in
Elrod, would demand that: (1) the state's interest in protecting chil-
dren and, arguably, in regulating the content of information flowing
into young minds outweigh the teacher's interest in speaking out on
matters of public concern; (2) the conduct of the teacher be in conflict
with the employment interests asserted by the government; 9 and (3)
the dismissal be the least drastic means available to achieve the state's
purposes.90 Some courts, however, have avoided applying such a rigor-
ous analysis in cases where an employee has been dismissed for advo-
cating gay rights.91 Instead, they have required only a rational
86. Id. at 572-73.
87. Id. at 570-73.
88. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 599 (1972). See notes 68 & 69 and accompany-
ing text supra. The latest decision in this line of cases, Givhan v. Western Line Cons. School
Dist., 99 S. Ct. 693 (1979), applied the Pickering analysis to a teacher's privately communi-
cated criticism of allegedly racially discriminatory policies of her school. The Court found
that the teacher's dismissal would be unjustified if based solely on her constitution-
ally-protected speech.
89. See notes 80 & 81 and accompanying text supra. It might also be argued that any
claimed relationship between a teacher's off-duty activities in support of gay rights and the
state's interest in protecting children arises out of personal prejudices held by members of
the school board and is therefore an impermissible justification for dismissal.
90. See note 82 and accompanying text supra. In this context, it could be contended
that regulations prohibiting political activities during school hours or on school grounds, or
even barring teachers from identifing themselves as school employees while engaging in
political conduct, are permissible and less drastic means than disqualification to achieve a
separation between the classroom and teachers' activities protected by the First Amendment
of which a school board disapproves.
91. See, e.g., McConnell v. Anderson, 451 F.2d 193 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405
U.S. 1046 (1972). See notes 219-23 and accompanying text infra.
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relationship between the teacher's conduct and the promotion of school
efficiency through his or her disqualification. By applying this lower
level of scrutiny, a teacher's dismissal will more easily be found to com-
port with constitutional parameters.
The foregoing discussion illustrates that the Constitution provides
a framework for examining the legitimacy of a gay teacher's dismissal
through the doctrines of procedural due process, substantive due proc-
ess and unconstitutional conditions. These theories, however, have
failed to provide adequate assurance that a gay teacher will not be dis-
missed solely on the basis of his or her sexual preference. As will be
seen in the next sections, the Supreme Court has not squarely ad-
dressed the issue, and the lower court decisions are in conflict.
I. Standards of Due Process for Gay Employees
A. Guidance from the Supreme Court
The Supreme Court has had numerous opportunities to apply the
principles outlined in Section I to cases involving homosexual employ-
ees. Gays have not only challenged the rationality and fairness of stan-
dards which led to their disqualification,92 but have also raised the
issue of an unconstitutional condition on employment when a gay em-
ployee's exercise of protected speech and associational rights has led to
dismissal.93 Yet the Court has thus far declined to consider these is-
sues.
The only case involving sexual orientation to which the Court has
given more than summary consideration is Boutilier v. Immigration and
Naturalization Service.94 In this 1967 decision, the Court upheld the
exclusion of a homosexual alien from the United States, relying on a
perceived Congressional intent to include homosexuals in the category
of "psychopathic personalities" to be barred from entry into the coun-
try.95 The precedential value of Boutilier today, however, is questiona-
ble. Research into the nature and etiology of homosexuality has
burgeoned in recent years;96 by 1974, greater knowledge and under-
92. See, e.g., id.; Gaylord v. Tacoma School Dist. No. 10, 88 Wash. 2d 286, 559 P.2d
1340, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 879 (1977).
93. See, e.g., Gish v. Board of Educ., 145 N.J. Super. 96, 366 A.2d 1337 (1976), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 879 (1977).
94. 387 U.S. 118 (1967).
95. Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (a)(4) (1976). But Yf. In re
Labady, 326 F. Supp. 924 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), in which an alien who had entered the United
States lawfully, acknowledged his homosexuality to public health authorities but was not
certified as a sex deviate but was instead found to be of good moral character, satisfying the
requirements for naturalization. Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1427 (a)(3)
(1976).
96. See, e.g., National Institute of Mental Health Task Force on Homosexuality: Final
Report and Background Papers (1972); A. BELL & M. WEINBERG, HOMOSEXUALITIES: A
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standing of diversity in sexual orientation resulted in the removal of
homosexuality from the list of mental diseases by the American Psychi-
atric Association.97 Were the Court to reconsider the issues presented
in Boutilier, its implicit endorsement of the traditional belief that ho-
mosexuality is a mental disease might well be withdrawn.
Yet even rejecting the mental disease notion, the Court might nev-
ertheless uphold a blanket exclusion of gays on other grounds,98 for
there are recent indications that the Court will not disturb morally-
based limitations on individual rights relating to sexual preference.
One of the more discouraging rulings for proponents of gay rights is
that in Doe v. Commonwealth's Att. 99 The Supreme Court in Doe
summarily atfirmed a district court denial of an injunction sought
against enforcement of Virginia's criminal sodomy statute where pri-
vate consensual homosexual acts were involved. 10 The district court
STUDY OF DIVERSITY AMONG MEN & WOMEN (1978); J. MONEY, MAN & WOMAN, BOY &
GIRL (1972); and research projects of the Center for Homosexual Education, Evaluation &
Research (CHEER), San Francisco State University, California.
97. 9 PSYCHIATRIC NEws 1 (1974). See N. Y. Times, Apr. 9, 1974. at 12, col. 4.
98. For example, conviction of a crime involving "moral turpitude" within five years
after entry into the United States will permit deportation if an individual is sentenced to
confinement as a result. 8 U.S.C. § 1251 (a)(4) (1976). Private consensual homosexual con-
duct is criminal in some states, a categorization with which the Supreme Court apparently
agrees. These acts, as well as loitering or solicitation in a public place to commit a homosex-
ual act, have been held to constitute crimes involving moral turpitude. See Velez-Lozano v.
Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 463 F.2d 1305 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Hudson v. Esperdy,
290 F.2d 879 (2d Cir. 1961).
99. 403 F. Supp. 1199 (8.D. Va. 1975), afdmem., 425 U.S. 901 (1976).
100. Many states have decriminalized such consensual private acts. See, CAL. PENAL
CODE §§ 286, 288a (West Supp. 1979); COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 18-3-401. -402, -403 (1978);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 53a-65, -70, -71, -72a, -72b, -73a (West Supp. 1978); DEL. CODE
tit. 11, §§ 765, 766, 772, 773 (Supp. 1978); HAW REV. STAT. § 768-71 (1968), repealedby 1972
Haw. Sess. Laws, act 9; ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 11-2, -3, -4, -5, -9 (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1978); IND. CODE §§ 35-41-1-2, -42-4-2 (1976); IOWA CODE ANN §§ 705.1, -.2 (West 1950),
repealedby 1976 Iowa Acts, ch. 1245, ch.4 § 526; ME. REV. STAT. tit. 17-A. §§ 251-255 (1978
Pamph.); MINN. STAT. § 617.14 (1964), repealed by Minn. Laws, ch. 507, § 12; NEB. REV.
STAT. §§ 28-407, -408 (1943), repealed by 1975 Neb. Laws, L.B. 23 § 9, N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 579.9; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-11 (1978); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 12.1-20-01 to -07
(1976); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2907.01, .02, .03, .04, .05, .06, .07, .09 (Anderson 1975 and
Supp. 1979); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 163.305, .325, .345, .385, .395, .405, .415. .425, .435, .445,
.455, .465 (1975-76); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 22-22-21, repealed bi' 1976 S.D. Sess.
Laws, ch. 158, § 22-8; WASH. REV. CODE §§ 9.79.140, .170, .180, .190, .200..210, .220 (1977);
W. VA. CODE §§ 61-8B-1 to -13 (1977); WYO. STAT. § 6-98 (1957), repealed by 1977 Wyo.
Sess. Laws, ch. 70, § 3. Decriminalization of private, consensual sodomy and oral copula-
tion may be due primarily to a recognition of the practices of married heterosexuals. See
Buchanan v. Batchelor, 308 F. Supp. 729 (N.D. Tex. 1970), rev'd on other grounds sub nom.
Wade v. Buchanan, 401 U.S. 989 (1971). See generaly Note, Consent, 'ot Morality, As the
Proper Limitation on SexualPrivacy, 4 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 637 (1977). Note, The Consti-
tutionality o/Laws Forbidding Private Homosexual Conduct, 72 MICH. L. REV. 1613 (1974).
In states where homosexual conduct is still criminal, statutes are rarely enforced against
consenting adults who act in private. See Ploscowe, Sex Offenses in the New Penal Law, 32
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had required only a rational basis to justify the statute, readily found in
the state's interest in promoting morality and decency and in sup-
pressing crime.' Since the court found no bar to the proscription of
homosexuality, the statute was ruled enforceable against private as well
as public conduct. 10
2
Focusing on the right to choose one's sexual partner as fundamen-,
tal in character, Judge Merhige in his dissent stated:
[I]ntimate personal decisions on private matters of substantial
importance to the well-being of the individuals involved are pro-
tected by the Due Process Clause. The right to select consenting
adult sexual partners must be considered within this category.
The exercise of that right, whether heterosexual or homosexual,
should not be proscribed by state regulation absent compelling
justification. 0 3
The dissent would, in effect, exWnd the zone of privacy covering abor-
tion and contraception decisions"° to encompass consensual, private
homosexual acts. The Supreme Court's summary affirmance indicates
that while mental disease is no longer a sufficient justification, immo-
rality is a proper rationale. As it now stands, Doe serves as powerful
precedent to thwart the efforts of gay rights activists.
In Carey v. Population Services International'05 the Supreme Court
indicated a willingness to reexamine traditional rationales for the regu-
lation of sexual conduct in general from a pragmatic standpoint. At
issue there was the constitutionality of a New York statute restricting
minors' access to contraceptives. Relying on the "significant state inter-
est" test used in Planned Parenthood v. Danforth,"6 where the Court
found the state's interest insufficient to justify restricting privacy rights
of minors through blanket prohibitions on abortion without parental
consent, the Court in Carey struck down the statute.
The application of a more rigorous standard than the easily satis-
fied rational basis test to justify state infringement of minors' privacy
rights would at first blush indicate that the Court might employ a
heightened level of scrutiny in the area of gay rights. But the recent
BROOKLYN L. REv. 274, 284 (1966); Project, The ConsentingAdult Homosexual and the Law.-
An Empirical Study ofEnforcement andAdministration in Los Angeles County, 13 U.C.L.A.
L. REv. 643, 688-89 (1966).
101. 403 F. Supp. 1199, 1202 (E.D. Va. 1975), aI'dmem., 425 U.S. 985 (1976).
102. Id.
103. Id. at 1204 (Merhige, J., dissenting).
104. See notes 15 & 16 and accompanying text supra.
105. 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
106. 428 U.S. 52, 75 (1976). In Danforth, the court found that the state's interest in en-
couraging the strength of the family unit was not served by permitting parental veto of a
minor's abortion; the parental interests were viewed as "no more weighty than the right of
privacy of the competent minor mature enough to have become pregnant." Id.
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denial of certiorari in Enslin v. Bean'017 indicates that this is unlikely.
Enslin, convicted of committing a "detestable crime against nature""s
and sentenced to a year in prison, challenged the constitutionality of
North Carolina's sodomy statute as applied to his consensual, private
conduct. 0 9 The Court's refusal to review the conviction implies that
protection for private, homosexual conduct will be left to the discretion
of state legislatures, foreclosing any hope engendered by Carey that
such statutes would be strictly construed." 0
Although the summary affirmance of Doe, underscored by the de-
nial of certiorari in Enslin, does not directly concern employment rights
of gays, its likely effect will be to curb judicial and legislative efforts to
recognize such rights. Together, the decisions undermine the idea that
unorthodox sexual preference is to be accorded constitutional protec-
tion. 111 But while the Supreme Court has thus far been unwilling to
consider employment protection for gays, lower federal courts, both at
the district and appellate level, have attempted to formulate standards
to ensure fair and rational review. These decisions, while lacking in
uniformity, nonetheless shed more judicial light on the problem than
has been provided by the Supreme Court.
107. 436 U.S. 912 (1978) (Brennan & Marshall, J.J., dissenting in denial), denying cert. to
565 F.2d 156 (4th Cir. 1977), aftg without opinion sub nom. Enslin v. Wallford, No. 77-1309
(E.D.N.C. Nov. 1978). See S.F. Examiner, May 15, 1978, at I, col. 3.
108. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-177 (1969). The Supreme Court has also upheld a similarly
worded Florida statute against a vagueness challenge because Florida cases had defined the
nature of the "detestable crime". Wainwright v. Stone, 414 U.S. 21 (1973).
109. Enslin owned a massage parlor/adult bookstore. A local detective recruited a
young Marine to ask Enslin for some "extra excitement," then hid in the bushes nearby
hoping to witness the act through binoculars so he could "run Enslin out of town." The act
of oral copulation was consummated in a back room which had no windows. The Marine's
testimony apparently formed the basis for the conviction. See S.F. Examiner, May 15, 1978,
at 1, col. 3.
110. In Carey, the majority stated that "'the Court has not definitively answered the
difficult question whether and to what extent the Constitution prohibits state statutes regu-
lating [private consensual sexual] behavior among adults'." 431 U.S. at 688 n.5 (quoting 431
U.S. at 694 n.17). This statement was disputed by Justice Rehnquist, who viewed the ques-
tion as settled by Doe. Id. at 718 n.2 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Although two members of
the Court-Justices Brennan and Marshall-would have granted certiorari in Enslin, it
seems evident that a majority of the Justices has foreclosed consideration of the issue regard-
less of circumstances surrounding the "criminal" conduct.
Ill. Freedom of choice in sexual matters, absent actual harm to the community, is a
recurrent theme in lower court cases which evinces a willingness to extend employment pro-
tection to gays. See, e.g., Acanfora v. Board of Educ., 359 F. Supp. 843, 851 (D. Md. 1973),
afd on other grounds, 491 F.2d 498 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 836 (1974), which
adopted the view expressed in two important studies that homosexuality should not be a
criminal offense. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.5(1) COMMENT (Tent Draft No. 4, 1955);
COMMITTEE ON HOMOSEXUAL OFFENSES AND PROSTITUTION, THE WOLFENDEN REPORT
(Great Britain) 48-49 (Amer. ed. 1963). The Supreme Court's nonrecognition of this free-
dom may give added impetus to efforts, such as California's initiative campaign to oust gay
teachers, discussed at note 21 supra, to withhold protection.
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B. Federal Court Standards
An analysis of lower federal court cases indicates that while some
differences exist, the recent trend is toward greater understanding and
acceptance of homosexuality, with a concomitant extension of constitu-
tional protection. In one of the earlier cases concerning gay employ-
ment rights, McConnell v. Anderson, 12 the Eighth Circuit adopted a
conservative approach indicating its disapproval of overt homosexual
behavior, despite lower court findings that private homosexual behav-
ior would not affect employment fitness.
The district court had enjoined the Board of Regents of the Uni-
versity of Minnesota from rejecting McConnell, a gay activist, from
employment as a librarian."I3 Under the Roth entitlement standard, 114
the applicant possessed no property interest. Relying on numerous au-
thorities,115 the district court ruled, however, that although the appli-
cant did not have "an inalienable right to be employed by the
university [he had] a right not to be discriminated against under the
Fourteenth Amendment due process clause.""' 6 Stating that a homo-
sexual was "entitled to the protection and benefits of the laws,""' 7 the
court held that a prospective employee's private life should not be his
employer's concern unless it can be shown to affect his efficiency in
performing his duties." 8
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit set aside the injunction, stressing the
"plenary and exclusive authority to govern, control and oversee the ad-
ministration of the University"" 9 vested in the board. In ruling that
112. 451 F.2d 193 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1046 (1972).
113. 316 F. Supp. 809 (D. Minn. 1970), ree'd, 451 F.2d 193 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
405 U.S. 1046 (1972). McConnell had been offered employment at the university. No em-
ployment contract had been signed pending approval by the Regents, but McConnell had
moved to Minneapolis expecting routine approval of his appointment. He applied for a
marriage license to wed a male law student, predictably drawing substantial publicity to
himself, though no reference was made to his potential association with the university. The
Regents permitted McConnell a hearing, after they held an initial closed meeting and rec-
ommended that his appointment not be approved. After the hearing the board unanimously
adopted a resolution that McConnell be rejected from employment on the grounds that his
personal conduct, as represented in the public and university news media, was not consistent
with the best interest of the university. Id. at 810-11.
114. See notes 39-45 and accompanying text supra.
115. McConnell v. Anderson, 316 F. Supp. at 814-15 (citing Keyishian v. Board of Re-
gents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967); Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 234, 239
(1957); Slochower v. Board of Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956); Weiman v. Updegraff, 344
U.S. 183 (1952)).
116. 316 F. Supp. at 814.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 815. Since the holding was based on due process fairness grounds, the court
did not reach McConnell's contention that employment rejection was a result of his exercise
of free expression.
119. 451 F.2d 193, 195 (8th Cir. 1971), cer. denied, 405 U.S. 1046 (1972).
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the board's action was not arbitrary and capricious, the court con-
cluded that ample factual information supported the board's judgment
that McConnell's appointment would not be in the best interest of the
university because his activist role would "foist tacit approval of this
socially repugnant concept upon his employer," including condonation
of "sodomous criminal activities."'2 0 The court, however, distin-
guished cases involving "mere homosexual propensities" as well as
those in which an applicant is excluded from employment "because of
a desire clandestinely to pursue homosexual conduct."' The infer-
ence can thus be drawn that homosexual employees might be tolerated
in the Eighth Circuit if their sexual preference remains covert.
The Fourth Circuit took a more liberal view of gay employment
rights, and also addressed the First Amendment issue not reached by
the McConnell court, 2 2 in Acanfora v. Board of Education,"3 where it
extended a district court decision which itself had afforded considera-
ble protection to gay teachers. Acanfora had been transferred to a non-
teaching position after the school board learned that he was a homosex-
ual. It was conceded that he had not, and would not, discuss his sexual
preference with students. During the litigation, however, Acanfora
garnered considerable publicity due to media awareness of his case.'2 4
The district court heard extensive expert testimony on the causes and
effects of homosexuality from recognized authorities. 25 Tracing the
Supreme Court's development of the right to personal privacy, 126 the
court declared: "The time has come today for private, consenting,
adult homosexuality to enter the sphere of constitutionally protectable
interests. Intolerance of the unconventional halt the growth of lib-
erty.' 127
In applying a procedural due process analysis, the Court found
that because the transfer implicated Acanfora's protected property and
liberty interests, 2 8 the board had wrongfully failed to provide an ad-
120. Id. at 196.
121. Id.
122. See note 118 supra.
123. 491 F.2d 498 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 838 (1974).
124. Acanfora had appeared on a Public Broadcasting System program and had given
interviews to other media in which he discussed the difficulties homosexuals ordinarily en-
counter. He sought community acceptance for gays but did not advocate homosexuality.
Id. at 500.
125. 359 F. Supp. 843, 847-49 (D. Md. 1973), af'd on other grounds, 491 F.2d 498 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 836 (1974) (testimony of Dr. Reginald Spencer Lourie, Dr. Felix
P. Heald, Dr. Stanford B. Friedman, Dr. William R. Stayton, Dr. John Money, NATIONAL
INSTITUTE OF MENTAL HEALTH TASK FORCE ON HOMoSExUALITY: FINAL REPORT AND
BACKGROUND PAPERS (1972)).
126. Id. at 850-51.
127. Id. at 851.
128. Ordinarily, a liberty interest in one's reputation is implicated when an employer
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ministrative hearing. Yet recognition by the court of his procedural
due process rights did not end the inquiry. The primary issue, in the
court's opinion, was the degree of constitutionally permissible board
regulation of Acanfora's speech and associational rights."2 9 The court
stated:
If private, consenting adult homosexuality is "protectable," it fol-
lows from the First Amendment that public speech, organization
and assembly in support of that goal by ordinary citizens is also
protectable. This syllogism does not, however, encompass the
definition of the boundaries of protectable speech and association
of teachers, who hold a special position of trust and responsibility
in the educational process. 130
Given the sensitive nature of the subject of homosexuality, the district
court felt that a gay teacher should exercise discretion and self-restraint
in speech or activities to avoid sensationalism and controversy which
might be deleterious to the educational process. It concluded that
Acanfora's public appearances exceeded the boundaries of protected
speech, and that the board's action therefore could not be characterized
as arbitrary and capricious.13 1
The Fourth Circuit affirmed the result on appeal, but disagreed
with the lower court's First Amendment analysis. It focused on the
lack of evidence that the public interviews disrupted the school, im-
paired Acanfora's teaching performance or were reasonably likely to
result in future impairment.'32 Absent such evidence, the appellate
court ruled that Acanfora's comments on a matter of public interest
were protected by the First Amendment and therefore did not justify
the school system's action.'33 Acanfora is significant because both the
district and appellate courts attempted to delineate specific guidelines
for applying a due process rationale to the issue of the rights of gay
makes a false and defamatory allegation which might preclude an employee from obtaining
other jobs. See notes 26-36 and accompanying text supra. In Acanfora, no such allegation
was involved, the facts surrounding the teacher's transfer and sexual preference not being in
dispute; yet the court felt that implications arising from the board's action posed a threat to
his reputation. This suggests that a protected liberty interest would be implicated not only
by a false charge concerning one's sexual preference, but also by an unproven allegation that
unorthodox sexual orientation adversely affected teaching ability. Id. at 853.
The court noted that homosexuality per se does not preclude successful job perform-
ance, but declined to remand the case for an administrative hearing because the board had
already prejudged Acanfora's fitness, thus casting doubt on the fairness of the procedure.
Id. at 851, 853.
129. Id. at 854-57.
130. Id. at 854.
131. Id. at 856-57.
132. 491 F.2d 498, 500-01 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 836 (1974).
133. Id. at 501. The circuit court of appeals denied Acanfora a remedy, however, be-
cause he was held to lack standing to raise the constitutional issues. See notes 235 & 236
and accompanying text infra.
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teachers. The principles which emerged would safeguard both private
activity as well as public speech and conduct which does not impair
performance of duties or interfere with the operation of schools. But
since Acanfora is a pre-Doe decision, its holding that homosexuality is
constitutionally protected is, perhaps, of questionable vitality.
McConnell and Acanfora illustrate the strikingly different attitudes
that exist among appellate courts with respect to unorthodox sexual
preference. At the district court level, one also finds a variety of ratio-
nales employed to analyze the problem. For example, an Oregon dis-
trict court managed to avoid the issue of gay employment rights by
striking down the applicable statute on vagueness and overbreadth
grounds. In Burton v. Cascade School District,134 a non-tenured high
school teacher was dismissed during her second contract year because
the principal of the school learned of her homosexuality from a stu-
dent's mother. There were no charges of improper involvement with
students or dereliction of teaching duties.135 After a hearing at which
Burton acknowledged that she was a practicing homosexual, she was
dismissed for "immorality" under an Oregon statute.' 36 The district
court held the statute void for vagueness and overbreadth,137 noting
that the statute also posed serious constitutional problems because it
did not require a nexus between conduct and teaching performance. 138
The court did not attempt to formulate a more appropriate due process
standard, commenting instead: "No amount of statutory construction
can overcome the deficiencies of this statute."'139
In contrast to Burton, a Delaware district court confronted the
problem of the constitutionality of employer limitations on freedom of
expression in Aumiller v. University of Delaware.140 Aumiller's contract
as a lecturer was not renewed because university officials disapproved
of his statements on homosexuality in three newspaper articles.' 41 The
134. 353 F. Supp. 254 (D. Ore. 1973), af'd, 512 F.2d 850 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
839 (1975).
135. Id.
136. OR. REv. STAT. § 342.530(1)(b)(1973-74): "Dismissal of teachers (1) During the pe-
riod of the contract ... the district school board shall dismiss teachers only for ... (b)
immorality .... (repealed by 1973 Or. Laws ch. 298 § 9).
137. 353 F. Supp. at 255.
138. Id. at 255 n.l.
139. Id. at 255.
140. 434 F. Supp. 1273 (D. Del. 1977).
141. Aumiller was a faculty advisor to a campus organization called the Gay Commu-
nity, which was formed for political, social and educational purposes. He was quoted exten-
sively in three newspaper articles written about the Community. This led to the decision not
to renew his contract. In a letter to the Chairman of the Board of Trustees, the President of
the University expressed his concerns that Aumiller's "evangelistic endeavor" would attract
homosexuals to the campus and the statements would cause harm and embarrassment to the
university, as well as his belief that Aumiller's statements were "shocking" and an "effront"
[sic] to him and the university. Id. at 1278-85 & n.7.
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court applied the Pickering analysis' 42 to determine whether the uni-
versity's interest was so significant as to outweigh Aumifler's right to
speak out on issues of public interest without jeopardizing his contin-
ued employment. It concluded that Aumiller had not, either willfully
or recklessly, sought to create the impression that he was speaking on
behalf of the university or that the university endorsed his views, 14 3 nor
did he exploit the university's facilities to advance his personal goals.'"
These factors, together with a lack of evidence as to any impairment of
Aumiller's performance as a lecturer or disruption of the university,
resulted in the court ruling that the university had violated Aumiller's
First Amendment rights by refusing to renew his contract solely be-
cause of his protected public statements.'
45
The court in Aumiller enumerated several factors which, had they
been present, would have supported the university's position: (1) an
express purpose of generating publicity or notoriety on the part of the
employee; (2) an attempt to convey the impression of university en-
dorsement; and (3) utilization of university facilities for advocacy of
homosexuality or for unauthorized activities.' 46 Absent these factors,
the university's justification was deemed insufficient. The Aumiller
opinion is a thoughtful and realistic effort to relate expression on the
controversial and emotionally-charged topic of homosexuality to em-
ployment rights within the framework of the Pickering analysis.
These federal decisions indicate that while a few courts still defer
entirely to administrative determinations concerning gay teachers,
others are willing to scrutinize the asserted state interests carefully, with
a view toward protecting individual rights. Where a teacher's conduct
is based on the exercise of First Amendment rights and is undertaken
as a good faith effort to educate the public or speak out on an issue of
public concern, the state may be precluded from basing disqualification
on that conduct. These decisions, however, by no means provide a
complete constitutional analysis. One group of cases which have fo-
cused more heavily on the substantive aspect of due process are those
involving civil service employees. Many of the prejudices which for-
merly operated to bar gays from federal employment under civil serv-
ice regulations are similar to those relied upon today to curtail the
employment of gay teachers. As a result, the recently enlightened stan-
dards developed by the civil service, which will be described in the next
section, should provide guidelines for determining the rights of gay
teachers.
142. Discussed at notes 83-87 and accompanying text supra.
143. 434 F. Supp. at 1288-89.
144. Id. at 1298-99.
145. Id. at 1302.
146. Id. at 1301.
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C. Civil Service Standards
A review of the development of due process standards applicable
to gay civil service employees indicates a gradual rejection of the no-
tion that homosexuals are per se unfit for governmental employment.
The nadir of federal employment protection for gays undoubtedly oc-
curred in the mid-twentieth century, when homosexuality was invaria-
bly equated with subversion of the government. 147 Diligent efforts
were made during the 1950's to purge homosexuals, along with other
"un-American" individuals, from government employment. 48 These
efforts were rewarded not only by an increase in the number of "per-
verts"-as they were termed in government reports-uncovered by in-
vestigations and fired from their jobs, but also by the resignation of
many employees who were threatened with investigation. 149 The broad
sweep of these inquiries shattered the careers of many individuals who
had had very limited homosexual experiences or who were merely sus-
pected of homosexuality, as well as those who were exclusively gay,
without regard to whether the conduct under investigation related in
any way to job performance.' 50
From this starting point, governmental attitudes toward gay em-
ployees have undergone considerable change, especially with regard to
what constitutes a sufficient nexus between homosexual activity and oc-
cupational fitness. This evolution is illustrated by three cases from the
District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals. In Dew r. Halaby,15' a
substantive due process challenge was brought against civil service reg-
ulations which permitted reliance upon pre-employment conduct in or-
der to justify removal for "such cause as will promote the efficiency of
the service."' 152 Dew, a married Air Force veteran and father of two
147. For a collection of news reports chronicling the efforts to weed out homosexuals and
Communists from government employment, see J. KATZ, GAY AMERICAN HISTORY 91-104
(1976).
148. A committee charged with investigating homosexuals in the government viewed
them as dangerous security risks, lacking in emotional stability, having a corrosive effect on
other employees and likely to seduce "normal" individuals. SENATE COMMITTEE ON EX-
PENDITURES IN THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS, EMPLOYMENT OF HOMOSEXUALS AND
OTHER SEX PERVERTS IN GOVERNMENT; INTERIM REPORT BY SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTI-
GATIONS PURSUANT TO S. RES. 280, S. Doc. 241, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950).
149. Between Jan. 1, 1947 and Apr. 1, 1950, 192 cases of homosexuals and other "sex
perverts" were handled by the government departments. Due to increased vigilance, 382
cases were handled between Apr. I and Nov. 1, 1950. Id.
150. See J. KATZ, GAY AMERICAN HISTORY 99-104 (1976). See, e.g.. N.Y. Times, June
26, 1952, at 4, col. 4, reporting the resignations of 117 State Department employees who had
been confronted with charges of homosexuality. See also Note, Government-Created Em-
ployment Disabilities of the Homosexual, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1738, 1742-43 (1969).
151. 317 F.2d 582 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. granted, 376 U.S. 904, cert. dismissed by agree-
ment ofthe parties, 379 U.S. 951 (1964).
152. 5 C.F.R. § 9.101 (Rev. 1961); see 5 C.F.R. §§ 9.102(a)(1), 22.201 (Rev. 1961).
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children, was discharged from his position as an air traffic controller
when the Civil Aeronautics Authority learned, from his previous em-
ployers, of several instances of homosexual conduct and marijuana
smoking in which Dew had engaged about nine years earlier. 153 Rely-
ing heavily on agency discretion to determine what acts might have an
adverse impact on the service, the majority found that Dew's removal
was not arbitrary or capricious. 154 The opinion cited earlier findings by
the Appeals Examiner that "[t]o require employees to work with per-
sons who have committed acts that are repugnant to the established
and accepted standards of decency and morality can only have a dis-
rupting effect upon the morals and efficiency of any organization."' 155
In dissent, Circuit Judge Skelly Wright noted the impropriety of
discharging a permanent employee on the basis of his pre-employment
conduct, since that conduct might have no connection with his job per-
formance.156 He warned against the danger that any civil service em-
ployee's "unfortunate adolescent acts"'1 7 might be unearthed through
research into his background "in an effort to turn up something 'dis-
qualifying,' ,158 and suggested that the efficiency of the service would
be better served by assurance to civil service workers that they will not
be subjected to such intrusive investigations. 15 9
Two years later, a new trend emerged when the same circuit court
required the government to establish a nexus between allegedly im-
moral conduct and occupational fitness. In Scott v. Macy, 160 the em-
ployee had passed civil service examinations in 1962, but a background
investigation revealed a 1947 arrest for "loitering" and a 1951 arrest for
"investigation." He refused to answer questions about homosexuality
and was subsequently disqualified for "immorality."' 16 1 The court, in
holding this action to be arbitrary, reasoned that the terms "immoral
conduct" and "homosexual" had different meanings for different peo-
ple;"'62 the lack of notice as to what conduct would disqualify an appli-
cant for government employment therefore rendered the
153. Dew had served as an air traffic controller for twenty months, receiving a perform-
ance rating of "satisfactory," before the Authority learned of the incidents. 317 F.2d at 583.
154. Id. at 587-88. 5 C.F.R. § 2.106 (Rev. 1961) provided for disqualification for
"[c]riminal, infamous, dishonest, immoral, or notoriously disgraceful conduct." The Court
took note of the responsibilities of Dew's job and upheld the agency's judgment that its
efficiency would be promoted through the removal of one who, through past conduct, had
not demonstrated qualities of character, stability and responsibility. 317 F.2d at 587-88.
155. Id. at 587 n.10.
156. Id. at 590 (Wright, J., dissenting).
157. Id. at 589.
158. Id. at 590.
159. Id.
160. 349 F.2d 182 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
161. Id. at 182-83.
162. Id. at 184.
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disqualification procedurally inadequate. 163 The majority emphasized
that the grave consequences of governmental imposition of a stigma
required that a commission at least "specify the conduct it finds 'im-
moral' and state why that conduct relate[s] to 'occupational competence
or fitness.' "164
The nexus requirement was further refined in Norton v. Macy,165
wherein the same circuit held that while homosexual conduct could be
a factor in determining fitness for federal employment, it alone was not
sufficient cause for dismissal. Norton was a budget analyst for NASA
with a good employment record. He had been dismissed after a traffic
arrest incident during which it was alleged that he had made a homo-
sexual advance to his male passenger. Norton claimed that he had ex-
perienced a blackout during the incident and admitted suspecting that
he might have engaged in homosexual activity during two previous
blackouts induced by drinking. 1 66
Writing for the majority, Judge Bazelon observed that due process
establishes at least the minimal requirement that dismissal from gov-
ernment employment not be arbitrary and capricious. Beyond this,
where the dismissal imposed a stigma or involved intrusion upon pri-
vacy, the "Due Process Clause may. . . cut deeper into the Govern-
ment's discretion"'67 by requiring that the agency demonstrate a
rational basis for its conclusion that an employee's discharge would
promote the efficiency of the service.' 68 Mere recitation of the immo-
rality of an employee's conduct would not suffice; there must be "some
ascertainable deleterious effect on the efficiency of the service."'1 69 The
court described several ways in which homosexual conduct might bear
on the efficiency of the service, but suggested that the effects of the
conduct were "broadly relevant" rather than controlling.170 The possi-
bility of embarrassment to the agency as a result of an employee's ho-
mosexual conduct would not, in itself, suffice; a nexus must also be
established between an employee's potentially embarrassing conduct
and the efficiency of the service. 7
163. Id. at 185-86 (McGowan, C.J., concurring).
164. Id. at 185. Then Circuit Judge Burger, in a vigorous dissent, took the position that
homosexual conduct is not an arbitrary ground for exclusion from employment. Id. at 190
(Burger, C.J., dissenting).
165. 417 F.2d 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
166. Id. at 1162-63.
167. Id. at 1164.
168. Id. at 1167.
169. Id. at 1165.
170. Noted were: 1) the potential for blackmail, which might jeopardize security; 2) any
evidence of an unstable personality; and 3) offensive overtures on the job or notorious con-
duct causing reactions in other employees or in the public with whom an employee came
into contact in the performance of his duties. Id. at 1166.
171. Id. at 1167.
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Norton has been distinguished on the basis of its narrow set of
facts, indicating, perhaps, that some jurisdictions are reluctant to adopt
the idea that homosexuality is not, per se, evidence of unfitness. In
Schlegel v. United States,'72 rendered shortly after Norton, the Court of
Claims upheld the firing of an Army Office of Transportation employee
for homosexual activities. The court distinguished Norton on the
ground that Norton had merely made a homosexual advance, whereas
Schlegel had consummated four homosexual acts with three different
men. It was, the court found, inevitable that retention of a practicing
homosexual employee would adversely affect the efficiency of govern-
ment service, primarily by affecting the morale and efficiency of co-
workers. 173 The concurring opinion of Judge Nichols, in which he
criticized Norton, viewed embarrassment to a government agency
through employment of a homosexual as a sufficient nexus with effi-
ciency of the service to justify disqualification.' 74
The strongest nexus between sexual preference and efficiency of
the service would seem to exist in security clearance cases. In an era
when severe prejudice forced gays to conceal their sexual orientation,
their susceptibility to coercion and blackmail was, perhaps, a valid con-
cern. If, however, an individual were to openly acknowledge his or her
sexual preference, the opportunity for blackmail would no longer exist.
This reality appears to be increasingly recognized in the case law. De-
nial of a security clearance must be supported by showing a nexus be-
tween homosexuality and an inability to effectively protect classified
information.175 In addition, the means used to establish such a nexus
are limited; any governmental inquiry into an individual's private life
must be confined to one reasonably designed to establish the relation-
ship between conduct and fitness, and may not unreasonably invade
172. 416 F.2d 1372 (Ct. Cl. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1039 (1970).
173. Three of Schlegel's superiors testified that morale and efficiency would be adversely
affected by his continued employment. The Court stated: "Any schoolboy knows that a
homosexual act is immoral, indecent, lewd, and obscene. . . . If activities of this kind are
allowed to be practiced in a government department, it is inevitable that the efficiency of the
service will in time be adversely affected." Id. at 1378.
174. Id. at 1382. (Nichols, J., concurring). Schlegel and the dissenting opinions in Nor-
ton and Scott also reflect a concern with judicial usurpation of executive and legislative
functions. See Norton v. Macy, 417 F.2d 1161, 1168-69 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (Tamm, C.J., dis-
senting); Scott v. Macy, 349 F.2d 182, 187-90 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (Burger, C.J., dissenting). The
thrust of their reasoning is that public policy formulated by administrative or legislative
bodies, even though unwise or unsound, must not be disturbed by courts unless it intrudes
into areas forbidden under the Constitution. See notes 57-59 and accompanying text suprq.
See also Anonymous v. Macy, 398 F.2d 317 (5th Cir. 1968) (per curiam), upholding an
agency determination disqualifying a homosexual employee. This failure to perceive a con-
stitutional dimension to employment disqualification of gays, or to require the establishment
of a rational nexus between homosexual conduct and employment fitness, reflects a stock
assumption that homosexuality is per se unfitness.
175. Gayer v. Schlesinger, 490 F.2d 740 (P.C. Cir. 1973).
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the individual's privacy.'7 6
Against the background of Scott and Norton, the coup de gr&ce
was finally administered to the mandatory exclusion policies of the civil
service by an injunction against their enforcement issued by a federal
district court. In Societyfor Individual Rights, Inc. v. Hampton,7 7 the
commission was enjoined from excluding or discharging an individual
solely because he or she is a homosexual or because employment of a
homosexual might bring the service into public contempt. 7  The court
recognized that homosexuality is deemed immoral by a majority of so-
ciety, but stated that "this alone does not justify denying. . . govern-
ment employment."'' 79
Civil service guidelines and regulations were subsequently revised
to conform to the requirements of the injunction. 8 ° The effect of the
revision is not yet clear, however. Disqualification may not be based
solely on "unsubstantiated" conclusions concerning possible embar-
rassment to the federal service, but actual embarrassment might sustain
disqualification. Precisely what constitutes "embarrassment"-and
how much of this embarrassment a federal agency should be required
to tolerate before a court will recognize it as an impediment to agency
efficiency-remain undefined in this line of cases.' 81
176. Id. at 752. See generally C. TRiPp, THE HOMOSEXUAL MATRIX 213-22 (1975) (dis-
cussion of intelligence operations designed to use homosexuals and the unfeasibility of
blackmailing government employees); Note, Security Clearancesfor Homosexuals, 25 STAN.
L. REv. 403 (1973).
177. 63 F.R.D. 399 (N.D. Cal. 1973).
178. Id. at 402. The ruling effectively invalidated the policy stated in FEDERAL PERSON-
NEL MANUAL SUPPLEMENT (Int.) 731-71: "Homosexuality and Sexual Perversion-Persons
about whom there is evidence that they have engaged in or solicited others to engage in
homosexual or sexually perverted acts with them, without evidence of rehabilitation, are not
suitable for Federal employment."
179. 63 F.R.D. at 400. The court left open the possibility that homosexual conduct might
justify dismissal where interference with governmental efficiency could be substantiated with
specificity, noting that the government was free to consider what particular circumstances
might suffice. Id. at 401.
180. The regulations were amended to delete "immorality" as cause for disqualification.
5 C.F.R. § 731.202(b) (1978). In addition, amended guidelines provided, in part: "Court
decisions require that persons not be disqualified from Federal employment solely on the
basis of homosexual conduct. The Commission and agencies have been enjoined not to find
a person unsuitable for Federal employment solely because that person is homosexual or has
engaged in homosexual acts. Based upon these court decisions and outstanding injunction,
while a person may not be found unsuitable based on unsubstantiated conclusions concern-
ing possible embarrassment to the Federal service, a person may be dismissed or found
unsuitable for Federal employment where the evidence establishes that such person's sexual
conduct affects job fitness." Suitability Guidelinesfor Federal Emploment, FEDERAL PER-
SONNEL MANUAL 731-3 at 8 (1975).
181. It should be noted that military service regulations still mandate disqualification of
gays, but these blanket exclusionary policies are being attacked, with some success, for their




While the federal courts have attempted to articulate substantive
due process standards which recognize the rights of gay employees, in
the state court systems this process generally takes place within a well-
defined framework of procedural rules. California and a minority of
other states have a two-tier statutory system of procedural due process
requirements for teacher disqualification. The first tier is addressed to
specific situations and is absolute in its terms. At this level, mentally
disordered sex offenders and persons convicted of certain enumerated
sex or narcotics offenses are barred from obtaining credentials and sub-
ject to automatic dismissal or license revocation without a hearing. 182
Since the offender has had notice and an opportunity to defend in the
criminal proceeding, procedural due process requirements are consid-
ered satisfied for purposes of disqualification.18 3
The second tier of California's system, which applies to all cases
which do not fall within the specific categories of the first level, requires
e.g., Saal v. Middendorf, 427 F. Supp. 192 (N.D. Cal. 1977). Due to the long-standing and
explicit nature of such regulations, however, it is more difficult for courts to override admin-
istrative determinations that a gay individual must be excluded from the service. Perhaps
the expressed discomfort of some courts with the current regulations will eventually result in
more individualized consideration of fitness for military service. See, e.g., Matlovich v. Sec-
retary of the Air Force, No. 75-1750 (D.D.C. July 16, 1976), in which a reluctant court
upheld an Air Force policy excluding homosexuals as applied to Sgt. Matlovich, who had
earned an excellent service record. The court found that the regulation was not so irrational
that it could be branded arbitrary, but closed with the hope that the military would "reexam-
ine the homosexual problem, to approach it in perhaps a more sensitive and precise way."
See also Duberman, The Case of the Gay Sergeant, N.Y. Times, Nov. 9, 1975, § 6 (Maga-
zine), at 67, col.2.
182. CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 44346, 44424-44426, 44435-44437, 87334-87336 (West Supp.
1977).
183. In Purifoy v. State Bd. of Educ., 30 Cal. App. 3d 187, 106 Cal. Rptr. 201 (1973), the
court upheld automatic suspension of a teacher's certificate, against due process and equal
protection challenges, after he had been convicted of violating CAL. PENAL CODE § 647
subds. (a), (d) (West 1972) (soliciting and loitering in a public tiolet). Statutes of other states
which permit automatic disqualification for certain crimes without a fitness hearing include:
IDAHO CODE §§ 33-1208, -1210; MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 125.09, 125.12 subd. 8 (West); N.D.
CENT. CODE §§ 15-36-15, 15-47-38; OR. REv. STAT. §§ 342.175, .865; PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§§ 12-1211, -1226 (PURDON); S.C. CODE §§ 59-25-150, -160, -430; S.D. COMPILED LAWS
ANN. §§ 13-42-9, -10; VA. CODE §§ 22-217.5, .8:1. Nevada, rather precisely tailoring the
punishment to fit the crime, revokes certificates of teachers convicted of certain sex offenses
where a student enrolled in a Nevada public school is the victim. NEv. REv. STAT.
§ 391.330. California's Education Code has been amended to permit fitness hearings to in-
dividuals convicted of any sex or narcotics offenses provided: 1) they have obtained or ap-
plied for a certificate of rehabilitation under CAL. PENAL CODE § 4852.01, -.07 (West 1972);
2) their probation has been terminated; and 3) the information or accusation has been dis-
missed under CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203A (West 1972). CAL. EDUC. CODE § 44346 (West
1977). Since misdemeanants are ineligible to apply for certificates of rehabilitation, satisfac-
tion of the latter two requirements will qualify them for fitness hearings. Newland v. Board
of Governors, 19 Cal. 3d 705, 566 P.2d 254, 139 Cal. Rptr. 620 (1977). See note 20 supra.
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notice and a hearing before a teacher may be disqualified." 4 While
this may appear to afford adequate due process rights to gay teachers,
the statutes provide a loophole upon which to predicate dismissal:
where homosexual conduct is at issue, a school board may base dismis-
sal or credential revocation on "immoral or unprofessional conduct" or
conviction of a non-enumerated crime involving moral turpitude. 185 In
such cases, the board's inquiry is limited to determining whether the
employee engaged in the conduct alleged, and whether such conduct
could be termed immoral, unprofessional or indicative of moral turpi-
tude. Once an affirmative determination has been rendered and ad-
ministrative remedies have been exhausted, the employee or licensee
may seek judicial review of both the evidence and the board's decision.
Other states with two-tier procedural system requirements corre-
spond generally to the California framework.' 86 The majority of states
permit fitness hearings in all cases of teacher disqualification, regard-
less of whether the employee has been convicted of sex or narcotics
offenses. Although statutes governing disqualification vary in specific-
ity from state to state,'87 most include language prohibiting "immoral-
ity." No state code, however, specifically bars homosexuals from the
teaching profession.'88 The terms "immoral or unprofessional con-
duct" and "moral turpitude" embodied in these typical discretionary
disqualification statutes have been criticized for vagueness and over-
breadth.'89 However, given the strong state interest in protecting
school children and the virtual impossibility of drafting statutes that
would cover all possible ways in which injury might result from reten-
tion of a particular employee, reviewing courts have generally refrained
from declaring such discretionary statutes facially void. 9 °
The California Supreme Court, in Morrison v. State Board of Edu-
184. CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 44422, 44430-44432, 87332, 87340-87342 (West Supp. 1977).
185. CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 44421,44427,44434,444345, 87331, 87340. 87344 (West Supp.
1977).
186. See note 183 supra.
187. Such statutes range from very general language permitting disqualification for
"cause", e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 80-1214 (1960), to fairly specific grounds for disqualifica-
tion, e.g., Miss. CODE ANN. § 37-9-59 (brutal treatment of a pupil); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
79, § 6-103 (West) (teaching disloyalty to the American government).
188. But see California Initiative Statute, Proposition 6, General election Nov. 7, 1978
[defeated]. See note 21 supra.
189. E.g., Burton v. Cascade School Dist., 353 F. Supp. 254 (D. Ore. 1973), af 'd, 512
F.2d 850 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 839 (1975) (statute voided for vagueness and over-
breadth); Morrison v. State Bd. of Educ., 1 Cal. 3d 214, 461 P.2d 375, 82 Cal. Rptr. 175
(1969) (statute construed to mean conduct which renders a teacher unfit to practice his pro-
fession).
190. The only exception thus far is the action of an Oregon federal district court in Bur-
ton v. Cascade School Dist., 353 F. Supp. 254 (D. Ore. 1973), a d 512 F.2d 850 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 839 (1975). See notes 134-39 and accompanying text supra. The Ore-
gon legislature subsequently revised revocation statutes to authorize disqualification for
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cation,19' declined to void a statute providing for license revocation for
"immoral or unprofessional conduct or moral turpitude."1 92 It added
substantial judicial gloss to the phrase, however, by construing it to
mean conduct which indicates unfitness to teach.' 93 This more re-
stricted interpretation was directed toward curing: (1) the breadth of
the terms' application,' 94 (2) variance in interpretation according to
time, location, context and popular mood,195 (3) lack of fair warning as
to what conduct is prohibited,196 and (4) the danger that officials might
probe into the private lives of teachers in searching for signs of immo-
rality. 197 The court focused on the purpose of fitness hearings and con-
cluded that the distinction between automatic and discretionary
disqualification statutes would be obliterated by a ruling that non-crim-
inal homosexual conduct was per se immoral. 98
The facts in Morrison were quite simple. The teacher had engaged
in limited homosexual conduct on four occasions over a one-week pe-
riod with a fellow teacher. Approximately a year after these incidents
the other participant reported the affair to the school administration
and proceedings to revoke Morrison's credential were instituted. At the
State Board of Education hearing, Morrison testified to having some
undefined homosexual problem at the age of thirteen, but he denied
having any homosexual inclination for more than twelve years. There
was no evidence that he had committed any acts of misconduct while
teaching. 199
Writing for the majority, Justice Tobriner set forth several factors
which a school board might consider in determining whether a
teacher's homosexual conduct affected his or her fitness to teach:
(1) the likelihood that the conduct may have adversely affected
students or fellow teachers;
"gross unfitness." ORE. REV. STAT. § 342.175(c). It could be contended that the new statute
is no less vague than its predecessor.
191. 1 Cal. 3d 214, 461 P.2d 375, 82 Cal. Rptr. 175 (1969).
192. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 13202 (West Supp. 1972) (current version at CAL. EDUC. CODE
§ 44421 (West Supp. 1977)).
193. 1 Cal. 3d 214, 238-40, 461 P.2d 375, 393-95, 82 Cal. Rptr. 175, 193-95 (1969), disap-
proving dicta in Sarac v. State Bd. of Educ., 249 Cal. App.2d 58, 63-64, 57 Cal. Rptr. 69, 72-
73 (1967), which suggested that all homosexual conduct, even though not shown to relate to
fitness to teach, warrants disciplinary action.
194. 1 Cal. 3d 214, 227-28, 461 P.2d 375, 384-85, 82 Cal. Rptr. 175, 184-85 (1969) (citing
a wide variety of state licensed professions and relevant codes under.which license holders
may be disciplined for immoral or unprofessional conduct or moral turpitude).
195. Id at 226-27, 461 P.2d at 383-84, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 183-84.
196. Id at 231, 461 P.2d at 387, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 187.
197. Id at 233-34, 461 P.2d at 390, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 190.
198. Id at 218-19 n.4, 461 P.2d at 377-78, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 177-78.
199. Id at 218-20,461 P.2d at 377-78, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 177-78. The conduct involved was
apparently mutual masturbation and occurred while the other participant was undergoing
severe emotional stress due to financial and marital problems.
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(2) the degree of such adversity anticipated;
(3) the proximity or remoteness in time of the conduct;
(4) the type -of teaching certificate held by the party involved;
(5) the extenuating or aggravating circumstances, if any, sur-
rounding the conduct;
(6) the praiseworthiness or blameworthiness of the motives re-
sulting in the conduct;
(7) the likelihood of the recurrence of the questioned conduct;
and
(8) the extent to which disciplinary action may inflict an adverse
impact or chilling effect upon the constitutional rights of the
teacher involved or other teachers.2 °°
In applying these factors to Morrison's conduct, the California
Supreme Court found that there was no evidence in the record to indi-
cate that his retention would pose a "significant danger of harm to stu-
dents or fellow teachers."201 Nor was there evidence that the events
had become so notorious as to impede his teaching performance. 0 2
The court noted that the board could reopen its inquiry into Morrison's
fitness, and any further findings of unfitness, confirmed by a trial court
after independent review of the evidence, would be upheld.20 3
The Morrison analysis is especially significant because it is the
only attempt by a state supreme court to give content to "immorality"
disqualification statutes as applied to homosexual conduct. Its ap-
proach has been applied to a wide range of conduct and professions in
other states, as well as in California.2" California legislative amend-
ments to the Education Code provide for considering the fitness of
felons and misdemeanants who meet statutory requirements; 20 5 such
amendments are likely to increase the number of mandatory fitness
hearings, bringing an even broader range of conduct within Morrison's
scope. A California ballot initiative which would have eroded existing
200. Id at 229, 461 P.2d at 386, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 186 (footnotes omitted).
201. Id. at 237, 461 P.2d at 392, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 192-93.
202. Id. at 239-40, 461 P.2d at 394-95, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 194-95.
203. Id. at 239-40, 461 P.2d at 394-95, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 194-95.
204. E.g., Board of Trustees v. Judge, 50 Cal. App. 3d 920, 123 Cal. Rptr. 830 (1975)
(teacher convicted of growing marijuana plant); Weissbuch v. Board of Medical Examiners,
41 Cal. App. 3d 924, 116 Cal. Rptr. 479 (1974) (physician convicted of marijuana posses-
sion); Vielehr v. State Personnel Bd., 32 Cal. App. 3d 187, 107 Cal. Rptr. 852 (1973) (tax
representative trainee convicted of marijuana possession); Oakland Unified School Dist. v.
Olicker, 25 Cal. App. 3d 1098, 102 Cal. Rptr. 421 (1972) (teacher distributed her pupils'
vulgar compositions to the class); Blodgett v. Board of Trustees, 20 Cal. App. 3d 183, 97 Cal.
Rptr. 406 (1971) (overweight physical education teacher); Erb v. Iowa State Bd. of Pub.
Instruction, 216 N.W.2d 339 (Iowa 1974) (teacher's adultery with another teacher); In re
Grossman, 127 N.J. Super. 13, 316 A.2d 39 (1974) (teacher's sex change); Denton v. South
Kitsap School Dist., 10 Wash. App. 69, 516 P.2d 1080 (1973) (teacher engaged in sexual
relations with minor student).
205. See note 183 supra.
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standards of fairness in employment disqualification of gay teachers
was recently defeated at the polls. 20 6 The strength of the prejudices
which led to the initiative's qualification for the ballot, however, may
indicate that efforts to eliminate gay teachers from California schools
will continue.
This section has attempted to lay the basic foundation from which
certain standards pertaining to gay teacher disqualification are emerg-
ing. The next section will review the manner in which these standards
are actually applied, both in California and elsewhere, with a view to-
ward exposing logical gaps which still permit unfair disqualification of
gay employees.
III. Inconsistent Application of Due Process Standards to
Disqualification of Gay Employees
A. Disagreement Among Federal Courts
1. Rational Nexus Requirement
Most federal courts agree that the disqualification of an employee
solely on the grounds of sexual preference would lack a rational basis
since some connection between such conduct and job performance
must be established in order to satisfy due process requirements. In
Norton v. Macy,2 °7 the court stated that homosexual conduct could be
relevant to the efficiency of the service in security clearance cases be-
cause of the potential for blackmail and because it might "be evidence
of an unstable personality unsuited for certain kinds of work. 208
Thus, if an employee made offensive oyertures on the job or engaged in
notorious conduct, the adverse reactions of his or her co-workers or the
public with whom he or she came into contact through the job might be
taken into account in evaluating occupational fitness. 209 In Norton's
case these factors were not present, and the court ordered him rein-
stated because of (1) the lack of public contact in his job; (2) the fact
that fellow employees were unaware of the incident; and (3) the "ques-
tionable legality" of police investigative tactics which brought the con-
duct to light.210 The reasoning in Norton has been followed in a
number of decisions which have extended substantive due process safe-
guards to gay employees, most notably Society for Individual Rights,
Inc. v. Hampton, 1 where the injunctive relief which was granted led
to the revision of civil service standards. The remedies in both cases
206. See note 21 supra.
207. 417 F.2d 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1969). See notes 165-71 and accompanying text supra.
208. 417 F.2d at 1166.
209. Id
210. Id at 1166-68 & nn.27 & 34.
211. 63 F.R.D. 399 (N.D. Cal. 1973). See notes 177-79 and accompanying text supra.
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were aimed at deterring improper federal bureaucracy enforcement of
"the majority's conventional moral code of conduct in the private lives
of its employees." 12
Some federal courts, on the other hand, have been unwilling to
preclude an agency from relying on majoritarian values. This attitude
has been manifested by complete deference to administrative determi-
nations, by finding that an employee's conduct rationally supported the
agency's action or by concluding that the requirements of a particular
job justified additional restrictions on employees' conduct. The last-
mentioned rationale was utilized in Adams v. Laird21 3 by the same cir-
cuit which rendered the Norton opinion. The particular job in Adams,
in contrast to that in Norton, involved a security clearance, as the em-
ployee was an electronics technician who worked with private compa-
nies on defense-related projects. The District of Columbia Circuit
Court of Appeals upheld the denial of a "top secret" clearance based
on Adams' admitted homosexual contacts and the board's belief that
the granting of such a clearance was not "clearly consistent with the
national interest. 2 14
Circuit Judge Wright based his dissent on several factors: the em-
ployee's eight years of faithful service under a "secret" clearance; the
improbability of his susceptibility to blackmail in light of the publicity
surrounding the litigation; and the unsupported assumption that he was
unstable, untrustworthy and unreliable.21 5 He criticized the board's re-
liance on stereotypical assumptions about homosexuals rather than
hard facts in finding that Adams' homosexuality had the required
nexus with unfitness for a security clearance. 216 By merely determining
that the employee was gay, the board presumed that due process had
been complied with. But its reliance on stereotypical notions that such
individuals are unfit for security clearance, somewhat reminiscent of
1950's rhetoric, 217 effected a per se disqualification because there was
no evidence that Adams fit the stereotype. In Justice Wright's view, the
board's ruling amounted to a "bill of attainder against all homosexu-
als." 2 18
Although most federal courts have discarded the notion that
homosexuals areper se unfit for certain jobs, the ease with which ho-
mosexual conduct is found to have a rational nexus with employment
fitness suggests that preconceptions about gays may operate to deny
212. 63 F.R.D. at 400-01 (quoting Norton v. Macy, 417 F.2d 1161, 1165 (D.C. Cir.
1969)).
213. 420 F.2d 230 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1039 (1970).
214. Id at 240.
215. Id at 242 (Wright, J., dissenting).
216. Id.
217. See notes 147-50 and accompanying text supra.
218. 420 F.2d at 242 (Wright, J., dissenting).
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them substantive due process even though procedural requirements are
met. In McConnell v. Anderson,2 19 the plaintiff alleged that his applica-
tion for library employment was rejected because of his homosexuality
and his desire, as exemplified by his application for a license to marry
his male lover, "to publicly profess his 'earnest' belief that homosexuals
are entitled to privileges equal to those afforded heterosexuals. 220
Although such conduct is unorthodox, it touches on associational,
speech and political expression rights. It should therefore fall within
the boundaries defined by Keyishian,22 1 Pickering222 and Perry,,223
which require that public employees not be forced to relinquish First
Amendment rights enjoyed by private citizens, and further, that they
not be disqualified for activities barred by the First Amendment from
being criminally punishable. The McConnell circuit court's reversal,
however, may imply approval of one of the school board's original con-
tentions, which was rejected by the district court,224 that applying for a
marriage license automatically connoted the practice of sodomy, then
criminal under Minnesota law.
Singer v. United States Civil Service Commission225 presented a
similar concern with the effects of an employee's lifestyle on the public
image of the government. Singer had been dismissed from the Seattle
office of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission2 26 for "im-
moral and notoriously disgraceful conduct" based upon his "public
.. .flaunting [of] his homosexual way of life" while identifying him-
self as an employee of a federal agency.227 This "flaunting" consisted
of: 1) his acts of kissing and embracing a male in the building where he
was formerly employed in another state, 2) his dress and demeanor, 3)
his application for a marriage license with another male, 4) the public-
ity surrounding the license application, 5) his active involvement in the
Seattle Gay Alliance and promotion of an Alliance symposium and 6)
219. 451 F.2d 193 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1046 (1972). See notes 112-21
and accompanying text supra.
220. 451 F.2d at 194. The Circuit Court of Appeals termed McConnelrs desire to engage
in these activities without jeopardizing his employment opportunity as imposing "extrava-
gant demands" upon the university. Id at 196.
221. See note 71 supra.
222. See notes 83-87 and accompanying text supra.
223. See note 88 and accompanying text supra.
224. 316 F. Supp. 809, 811 (D. Minn. 1970), rev'd, 451 F.2d 193 (8th Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 405 U.S. 1046 (1972).
225. 530 F.2d 247 (9th Cir. 1976), vacated and remanded for reconsideration in light of
the position now asserted by the Solicitor General in his memorandum filed on behalf of the
U.S. Civil Service Commission, 429 U.S. 1034 (1977) (Burger, C.J., White & Rehnquist, JJ.,
dissenting).
226. Singer was dismissed under the regulations in force in 1972, prior to revisions pre-
cluding disqualification for homosexuality or agency embarrassment. See notes 180 & 181
and accompanying text supra.
227. 530 F.2d at 251.
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his open acknowledgement of being gay.228 Singer sought First
Amendment protection for his conduct but the court found that the
government interest in promoting efficiency of the service outweighed
the employee's interest in exercising his First Amendment rights
through "broadcasting" his homosexual activities. The nexus require-
ment was satisfied insofar as such publicity would "'reflect discredit
upon the Federal Government as his employer;" '229 Singer was thus un-
suitable for civil service employment. As in McConnell, the prospect of
adverse public opinion was influential in Singer but evidence of his
competence was barely considered.23 ° The peremptory nature of the
Singer analysis apparently did not satisfy the new civil service require-
ments, since, after further proceedings, the Federal Employee Appeals
Commission ultimately ordered Singer's reinstatement with back
pay.231
The problem illuminated by McConnell and Singer is the extent to
which a gay public employee, particularly a teacher, must remain
"closeted" in order not to jeopardize his continued employment. If all
avenues of public expression concerning one's own sexual preference
must be avoided, gay public employees are effectively precluded from
taking part in efforts to achieve equality and acceptance. Where public
expression is conducted during off-duty hours and does not involve
harm to others or specifically involve an employer, the doctrine of un-
constitutional conditions, as outlined in Pickering,32 might preclude
employment disqualification based on such activities. Thus, judicial
228. Id at 249.
229. Id at 255.
230. Id at 250 n.4. In fact, Singer had been rated by his supervisor as superior or very
good in various categories of job performance. A letter from his coworkers expressed the
opinion that he was competent and that their experience with him had been "educational
and positive."
231. It is likely that Singer was remanded for reconsideration under the amended regula-
tions which became effective before the circuit court judgment was rendered but after the
district court decision was handed down. The remand might have seemed an empty gesture
in view of the circuit court's statement: "We do not imply that the amended regulations and
guidelines would require a different result under the facts of this case." Id at 255 n.16. In
fact, Singer's employer, the Equal Employment Opportunities Commission, again moved
for his disqualification on remand for the same reasons. This time, however, the Federal
Employee Appeals Commission ordered Singer's reinstatement. Federal Employees Ap-
peals Authority, United States Civil Service Commission, No. SE 071380002) (July 21,
1978).
232. See notes 83-87 and accompanying text supra. Some courts' apparent willingness to
tolerate discreet homosexual conduct, combined with their unwillingness to recognize any
First Amendment protection for speech and associational rights connected with sexual pref-
erence, reflects an anomaly in reasoning which may be grounded in majoritarian values. A
parallel might be drawn to the argument advanced by the plaintiff in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163
U.S. 537 (1896), who, being seven-eighths Causcasian and only one-eighth African, con-
tended that his indistinguishability from whites should entitle him to all rights enjoyed by
whites. The issue should not be how well an individual can blend in with the majority of
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scrutiny of a claimed nexus between homosexuality and job fitness
should be more rigorous when First Amendment rights are involved
than the rational basis inquiry employed in cases such as Scott and
Norton.
The trend reflected in Norton and Hampton, where an employer
was required to establish a nexus between homosexual conduct and un-
fitness for employment, appears to be more widely accepted than that
in Adams or McConnell. Yet the mere requirement that a nexus be
shown does not always guarantee concrete relief. The effectiveness--or
ineffectiveness-of available remedies will be discussed below.
2. Remedies
Where a court finds that a public employee's disqualification was
based on unconstitutional grounds, it may remand the case for recon-
sideration of the employee's fitness in light of the court's ruling, or it
may make its own final determination. In either event, a wrongly dis-
qualified employee may emerge with a less than satisfactory remedy, or
no remedy at all, as reflected in the teacher dismissal cases. In Acanfora
v. Board of Education,233 for example, the district court would have
safeguarded the teacher from disqualification based on his sexual ori-
entation but nevertheless held his related speech unprotected. 34 While
the circuit court went further, acknowledging First Amendment protec-
tion for Acanfora's public statements, it also denied reinstatement on
the technical ground that Acanfora lacked standing to challenge the
constitutionality of the county's policy of not hiring homosexuals.235
Lack of standing was based on his intentional omission of his affiliation
with a homophile organization on his employment application due to
his fear that he would not even be considered for employment if that
information were included.236
society, but rather whether the uniqueness of the individual is worthy of constitutional pro-
tection in a society which places a positive value on diversity and tolerance.
233. 359 F. Supp. 843 (D. Md. 1973), af don other grounds, 491 F.2d 498 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 836 (1974).
234. See notes 123-33 and accompanying text supra.
235. Acanfora v. Board of Educ., 491 F.2d 498, 504 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 836
(1974).
236. There is some likelihood that if Acanfora had included his affiliation on the em-
ployment application, no legal question as to the propriety of his disqualification would
have arisen, for the board could simply have rejected him for more unassailable reasons.
See Aumiller v. University of Delaware, 434 F. Supp. 1273, 1285 (D. Del. 1977), where
university officials discussed the merits of giving a budgetary reason for not renewing
Aumiller's contract, rather than admitting the real reason. See notes 140-46 and accompa-
nying text supra. The Acanfora district court did not consider the standing argument to be
worthy of discussion, Acanfora v. Board of Educ., 359 F. Supp. 843, 845 (D. Md. 1973), ajf'd
on other grounds, 491 F.2d 498 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 836 (1974); ef. Andrews v.
Drew Mun. Separate School Dist., 371 F. Supp. 27 (N.D. Miss. 1973), aft'd 507 F.2d 611 (5th
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The court in Burton v. Cascade School District237 evinced a similar
reluctance to enforce its decision in a meaningful way. Despite its in-
validation of Oregon's statute on vagueness grounds, the court permit-
ted the school district to deny reinstatement to Burton, limiting her
relief to damages. 238 The rationale for this result was expressed as a
balancing of Burton's interest in completing her one-year employment
contract against the possible disruption of the school if she were al-
lowed to remain.2 39 The balance struck in Burton can be questioned
because the decision in effect permits a school district to "buy out" an
unwanted employee, although outright dismissal would be constitu-
tionally impermissible. Such relief would seem to be wholly inade-
quate when measured against the value of an opportunity to prove
one's capabilities and perhaps earn permanent employment in one's
chosen field. This approach is particularly unfair where there has been
no evidence of actual, as opposed to merely speculative, detriment to
the school. Furthermore, the propriety of balancing community reac-
tion against an individual's constitutional rights is doubtful. As dis-
senting Judge Lumbard pointed out: "If community resentment was a
legitimate factor to consider, few Southern school districts would have
been integrated.""24
Reinstatement has been viewed as the proper remedy in a number
of decisions where a public employee has been improperly terminated
Cir. 1975), wherein an unwritten rule which precluded unwed mothers from school employ-
ment was challenged on due process and equal protection grounds. One of the two plaintiffs
had lied on her employment application, stating that she had no children. The misrepresen-
tation did not preclude her from having standing to challenge the constitutionality of the
policy, which was subsequently found to have no rational relation to the school's stated
objective of creating a proper moral atmosphere. The court found that the policy created an
irrebuttable presumption that an unwed parent was an improper role model and that em-
ployment of an unwed parent would encourage school-girl pregnancies.
The difference between the court's emphasis on standing in Ancanfora and Andrews
may reflect only a policy of different circuits. On the other hand, it may reflect dissonance
between a court's recognition of constitutional rights for gays and a lingering reluctance to
enforce such rights. Perhaps tolerance for unwed parenthood has reached a level as yet
unattained by homosexuality.
237. 353 F. Supp. 254 (D. Ore. 1973). The Ninth Circuit upheld the district court's re-
fusal to order Burton's reinstatement as a teacher. See 512 F.2d 850, 851-52, 854 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 839 (1975). See notes 134-39 and accompanying text supra.
238. 512 F.2d at 851-53. Burton was under a year-to-year contract with the school dis-
trict. She had completed her second month when whe was dismissed, having served out the
previous year's contract without incident. The district court awarded her a full salary for the
remainder of the year one-half of her salary for the following year and attorney's fees and
costs. It also ordered that the board expunge from its records and files all references to her
dismissal. Id.
239. Id. at 852-53. The court noted that the long-standing legal controversy could be a
factor in causing disruption to the school if Burton were reinstated for the few months re-
maining in her contract.
240. Id. at 855 (Lumbard, J., dissenting).
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from employment based on the exercise of rights protected by the First
Amendment.241 In Aumiller v. University of Delaware,2 42 for example,
the court stated: "The violation in this case appears to present the clas-
sic situation in which reinstatement accompanied by an award of back
salary constitutes an appropriate method of vindicating Aumiller's
rights."243 The court technically granted Aumiller's reinstatement for
the term for which his contract had not been renewed on constitution-
ally impermissible grounds. This term had expired, however, by the
time the decision was rendered. The court declined to reinstate Aumil-
ler for a future term of a year because he had no property interest in
future employment. Instead, the court awarded Aumiller the salary he
would have earned had he not been wrongfully dismissed.2' Since the
award of back salary was predicated on Aumiller's right to reinstate-
ment for the expired term, actual reinstatement would appear to turn
on the vicissitudes of the court's calendar. Nevertheless, Aumiller is
one of the few federal court decisions in the area of wrongful disqualifi-
cation of a gay school employees which intimates that reinstatement
would be a proper remedy.
In contrast to situations involving teachers, Civil Service cases
which have overturned prior determinations of "immorality" have gen-
erally ruled that the evidence did not support the disqualification. In
Norton v. Macy,2 4 5 for example, the court simply held that Norton's
conduct did not justify dismissal.246 Similarly, in Scott v. Macy,2 47 af-
ter the court had remanded the case, restoring Scott to the status of an
eligible applicant, 48 a further Commission disqualification for reasons
relating to Scott's homosexual conduct was overturned by the same
court.
2 4 9
The disparity between civil service and teacher dismissal cases in
federal courts may be due to the courts' greater deference to commu-
nity sentiment in the latter cases. In general, teachers probably have
greater contact with members of the community than do most civil
service employees, and it may be that the confidence of the community
241. E.g., Sterzing v. Fort Bend Independent School Dist. 496 F.2d 92 (5th Cir. 1974);
Stewart v. Pearce, 484 F.2d 1031 (9th Cir. 1973); Woodward v. Hereford Independent
School Dist., 421 F. Supp. 93 (N.D. Tex. 1976).
242. 434 F. Supp. 1273 (D. Del. 1977). See notes 140-46 and accompanying text supra.
243. 434 F. Supp. at 1308.
244. Id. at 1308-10. In addition to back wages, Aumiller was awarded $10,000 in com-
pensatory damages for emotional distress and $5,000 in punitive damages against the presi-
dent of the university for his "malicious or wanton disregard for Aumiller's constitutional
rights." Id. at 1312-13.
245. 417 F.2d 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
246. Id. at 1168. See notes 165-71 and accompanying text supra.
247. 349 F.2d 182 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
248. Id. at 185. See notes 160-64 and accompanying text supra.
249. Scott v. Macy, 402 F.2d 644 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
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is an important ingredient in the successful operation of a school sys-
tem. On the other hand, it would seem to be no more rational or fair to
base disqualification on adverse community sentiment concerning a
gay teacher than it would be to permit disqualification of a teacher for
his or her unpopular religious or political affiliations. These are factors
which are extraneous to the teaching process. Nevertheless, the un-
availability of adequate remedies to gay teachers in the federal courts
continues.
B. Inconsistent Application in State Courts
1. Rational Nexus Requirement
State court decisions embody many of the same inconsistencies
which appear in the federal court rulings. Here, however, traditional
prejudices against gay teachers appear to be even more firmly en-
trenched. A Washington Supreme Court case, Gaylord v. Tacoma
School District,250 demonstrates the vitality of the view that gays are
per se unfit to teach. Gaylord, a highly-rated high school teacher, was
dismissed after twelve years for "immorality"25 because he admitted to
being gay in response to a school official's questioning, initiated after
the official had been informed by a former student of his "impression"
that Gaylord was a homosexual. The court upheld the school
board's policy and ruled it constitutional as applied to Gaylord.
The court found that Gaylord's status was covered by the school
board policy because homosexuality is "widely condemned as im-
moral. ' 253 Since choice is an essential element of morality, and since
the Court viewed homosexuality as an acquired orientation for most
individuals, it reasoned that one who chooses this orientation must be
held morally responsible. 4 Yet the record showed no evidence of ho-
mosexual conduct-only Gaylord's acknowledgement of his homosex-
uality. The majority, however, concluded that his admission implied
homosexual conduct.155 Having determined that homosexuality was
250. 88 Wash. 2d 286, 559 P.2d 1340, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 879 (1977).
251. These grounds for dismissal were contained in Tacoma School Dist. No. 10, Policy
No. 4119 (5), quoted in Gaylord v. Tacoma School Dist. No. 10, 88 Wash. 2d at 290, 559
P.2d at 1342.
252. 88 Wash. 2d at 298, 559 P.2d at 1346.
253. Id. at 295, 559 P.2d at 1345.
254. Id. at 296, 559 P.2d at 1345-46.
255. Id. at 297-98, 559 P.2d at 1344. Both dissenters criticized the majority's facile infer-
ence that Gaylord had engaged in illegal or immoral conduct. Id. at 300-02, 306-07, 559
P.2d at 1348-49, 1351 (Dolliver and Utter, JJ., dissenting). The majority, however, had indi-
cated that proof of homosexual status alone would sustain the dismissal. It stated that
school directors are not required to take an unacceptable risk in discharging their fiduciary
duties by waiting for a specific instance of overt homosexual conduct before acting to pre-
vent the perceived harm. Id. at 299, 559 P.2d at 1347. The likelihood of harm in Gaylord's
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immoralper se, the court did not find it necessary to determine whether
a nexus existed between Gaylord's sexual orientation and his fitness to
teach. While an arguable link was implied in the court's finding that
"confusion, suspicion, fear, expressed parental concern and pressure
upon the administration" might impair Gaylord's efficiency as a
teacher,256 the evidence indicated that such an impairment was largely
conjectural.25 7
Several collateral issues arise from the Gaylord opinion. First, had
Gaylord responded dishonestly to the inquiry about his sexual orienta-
tion, an investigation into his private life might possibly have ensued.
Thus, a mere suggestion of homosexuality could trigger whatever sort
of inquiry a school board might wish to conduct. Second, the court
relied on parental objections as a possible nexus between homosexual-
ity and unfitness to teach. The few objections which were actually
made, however, did not surface until after Gaylord's homosexual status
became a matter of public knowledge. This information was made
public by the school board, not by Gaylord. The court's decision could
have the effect of arming school boards with a bootstrapping mecha-
nism which it may unleash on even the most "closeted" gay teacher.
Any diligent school board could discover a teacher's homosexuality,
make it public knowledge, wait for adverse reactions which it could
then use as the nexus by which to justify dismissal.258 Gaylord thus
demonstrates the continuing operation of traditional prejudices in dis-
qualifying gay teachers for "immorality," along with the danger of un-
justified invasions of personal privacy.
While the finding of "immorality" is a major avenue for disqualifi-
cation of gay teachers, it is not the only method. For example, the con-
stitutionality of a New Jersey statute which authorized requiring a
psychiatric or physical examination of any school employee "when-
ever, in the judgment of the board, an employee shows evidence of
deviation from normal, physical or mental health"25 9 was upheld in
Gish v. Board of Education.260 The board had ordered Gish, who had
been a high school teacher for seven years, to submit to a psychiatric
case was rather remote, however, in view of the fact that he had been a respected teacher for
twelve years. Even his best friends on the faculty did not know he was gay. Id. at 303, 559
P.2d at 1349 (DoUiver, J., dissenting).
256. Id. at 297-98, 559 P.2d at 1346-47. The court pointed out that one student and three
teachers had expressly objected to Gaylord's remaining on the faculty. In addition, the vice
principal, principal and a retired superintendent testified that Gaylord's retention would
create problems.
257. See note 255 supra.
258. To paraphrase Justice Douglas' query in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965): Would we allow school boards to invade teachers' private lives searching for signs of
homosexuality? Id. at 485.
259. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 18A:16-2,-3 (West 1968).
260. 145 N.J. Super. 96, 366 A.2d 1337 (1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 879 (1977).
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examination because it believed his gay rights activism displayed such
deviation as would affect his ability to teach, discipline and associate
with his students, z 61 despite the absence of instances of improper con-
duct in or out of the classroom with respect to students.262
Two psychiatrists were selected by the school board to examine
Gish but each expressed negative opinions of his mental health prior to
any examination, thus casting doubt on the impartiality of the in-
quiry.263 The court rejected Gish's contention that due process de-
manded an impartial decision-maker, since the requirement that he
undergo a psychiatric examination could not be classified as a penalty
or sanction. It found that the board's duty to protect children out-
weighed the "minimal" deprivation of rights Gish would suffer by sub-
mitting to the examination.264 This finding ignores a critical factor:
presumably, the purpose of such an examination is to furnish the board
with expert opinion of a teacher's fitness to be considered in subsequent
disqualification proceedings. If the "experts" have begun to form their
opinions before examining a teacher, their lack of neutrality would in-
ject an element of unfairness into the ultimate board determination.
Such a predetermined board hearing would be no more than a mere
formality for the employee.
Gish also sought to avoid psychiatric examination on First
Amendment grounds.265 Although the court acknowledged his right to
engage in the conduct and speech mentioned in the board's list of rea-
sons for the examination, it again found that the board's interest in
assuring the fitness of teachers was of paramount importance. Without
even discussing the possible chilling effect on teachers' speech and asso-
ciational rights resulting from the threat of psychiatric examination and
subsequent disqualification, the court deemed the board's determina-
tion "fair and reasonable. '2 66
Throughout the opinion, the court emphasized that Gish's exami-
nation was sought because of his gay activism, never avowing that
homosexualityper se would be cause for examination and disqualifica-
tion. Yet this appears to be the underlying rationale for the board's
261. Id. at 100-01, 103-04, 366 A.2d at 1339-40, 1341-42. Gish was president of the New
Jersey Gay Activists Alliance, promoted the Alliance in the public media, attended a con-
vention of the National Education Association and helped to organize a gay caucus there.
Cf. Stewart v. Pearce, 484 F.2d 1031 (9th Cir. 1973), where a college English teacher, under
a contract, was ordered to undergo a psychiatric examination after he participated in
anti-Vietnam war and anti-college administration demonstrations. No reason for the exam-
ination order was provided. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that this order vio-
lated due process requirements of notice and a proper hearing.
262. 145 N.J. Super. at 103, 366 A.2d at 1341.
263. Id. at 100-02, 366 A.2d at 1339-40.
264. Id. at 106-07, 366 A.2d at 1342-43.
265. Id. at 104, 366 A.2d at 1341.
266. Id. at 105, 366 A.2d at 1342.
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action, since it also indicated concern over the strong possibility of psy-
chological harm resulting from the students' continued association with
Gish, independent of his activism. 67 Although the court avoided any
discussion of how such harm might result, it implied that associating
with Gish might somehow transmit sexual unorthodoxy to "impres-
sionable, adolescent pupils. 268
Similar reasoning led to the disqualification of a teacher for "inca-
pacity" in Zn re Grossman.269 Grossman, who had been a male, ten-
ured music teacher for fourteen years, was dismissed after lengthy
procedural processes because he had undergone a sex change. The
state Commissioner found that there was no evidence that Grossman
had engaged in deviant, abnormal or unbecoming conduct, and that
the limited public protest against Grossman's continued employment
would not disrupt the school if she were retained. Her dismissal was
sustained, however, on the Commissioner's finding that Grossman's
"incapacity" provided just cause.270 No adverse findings existed as to
her competence in conveying the subject matter to students. Instead,
the finding of incapacity was based on the possibility suggested by ex-
pert psychiatric testimony for the board that some students might suffer
emotional harm through the knowledge that their teacher had under-
gone a sex change. The court emphasized that the conclusion of inca-
pacity related only to Grossman's fitness to teach in the school system
where she had taught prior to the sex change.271 In theory, then, the
board's dismissal should not preclude Grossman from obtaining other
school employment. The court's approval of the Commissioner's rec-
ommendation that the board submit a disability retirement application
on Grossman's behalf,272 however, suggests its recognition of the stig-
matizing effect of dismissal for incapacity.
As applied to gay teachers, the reasoning utilized in Grossman
could result in disqualification for "incapacity" if the fact of a teacher's
sexual orientation became known. Grossman did not require evidence
of actual disruption of the school; the mere possibility that some stu-
dents might become disillusioned upon discovering the lifestyle of their
teacher was sufficient. Furthermore, the court's heavy reliance on ex-
pert testimony as to Grossman's suitability as a role model for students
267. Id. at 100-01, 366 A.2d at 1339-40.
268. Id. at 105, 366 A.2d at 1342.
269. 127 N.J. Super. 13, 316 A.2d 39 (1974).
270. Id. at 22, 316 A.2d at 43.
271. Id. at 29-33, 316 A.2d at 47-49.
272. Id. at 33, 316 A.2d at 49. The Grossman approach might encourage recourse to
compensating teachers dismissed for homosexual status by granting them disability pen-
sions. Such a remedy would probably be financially impractical, however, because the
number of gay teachers is undoubtedly far greater than the number who have undergone sex
reassignment.
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suggests that a similar result could be obtained in gay employment dis-
missal cases, provided that the board consults an expert who adheres to
traditional concepts.273
These state court cases demonstrate the tendency to equate homo-
sexuality, either explicitly or implicitly, with immorality, deviation
from normal mental functioning or incapacity. While hearings may be
afforded, adoption of aper se approach effectively eliminates the possi-
bility that a gay teacher can establish the lack of a nexus between sex-
ual orientation and occupational fitness. In Calfornia, the per se
approach has been rejected by the supreme court, but, as will be seen,
its alternative approach has not guaranteed substantive fairness in all
cases.
2 Application of California's Nexus Requirement
The California decision in Morrison v. State Board of Education274
seemingly protects teachers from arbitrary disqualification for uncon-
ventional sexual behavior by requiring that a school board demonstrate
the manner in which his or her conduct relates to employment fitness.
It will be recalled, however, that the conduct involved in Morrison was
circumspect and non-criminal even before the revision of penal codes
removed sanctions for consensual private acts. Moreover, it had oc-
curred at least a year before it was reported to school officials.275 The
narrow facts of the case, though presenting an ideal opportunity for the
court to delineate the nexus requirement, also make Morrison easily
distinguishable from most other cases involving sexual unorthodoxy.
In addition, the court cautioned that the law does not require that
homosexuals be permitted to teach in California schools. 276 This reser-
vation and the limited facts of Morrison may tend to curtail the appli-
cation of its due process safeguards to openly gay teachers.
Even where it would be appropriate, the Morrison analysis is fre-
quently applied superficially-if at all-to cases involving non-conven-
tional sexual conduct. Despite Morrison's express purpose of retaining
the statutory distinction between automatic disqualification (for speci-
fied crimes) and discretionary disqualification (when other conduct is
at issue),277 some courts are quick to disregard it when the conduct is
less innocuous than that of Morrison. This problem often arises where
a gay educator has been acquitted of charges of public sexual miscon-
273. See Note, Dimissal of a Transsexualfrom a Tenured Teaching Position in a Public
School, 76 Wis. L. REv. 670 (1976).
274. 1 Cal. 3d 214, 461 P.2d 375, 82 Cal. Rptr. 175 (1969). See notes 191-204 and accom-
panying text supra.
275. See note 199 and accompanying text supra.
276. 1 Cal. 3d at 240, 461 P.2d at 394, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 194.
277. Id. at 218-19 n.4, 461 P.2d at 377-78 n.4, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 177-78 n.4. See note 198
and accompanying text supra.
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duct,2 78 has pleaded guilty to a lesser charge2 79 or has been arrested and
never charged.28 At least one appellate court, in Moser v. State Board
of Education,28' has sustained credential revocation upon a finding of
homosexual behavior in a public place without any further nexus re-
quirement.28 2 Another appellate court, in Governing Board v. Met-
calf,283 ignored the Morrison formulation,28 4 relying instead on aper se
determination of unfitness buttressed by the school principal's opinion
that if Metcalf's conduct became known to the public, his exemplar
image would be destroyed and he would be unable to function effec-
tively as a teacher.285
Faced with this trend in the lower courts, the California Supreme
Court specifically rejected the limitation of Morrison to non-criminal
private conduct in Board of Education v. Jack M.286 There, the teacher
had been arrested for soliciting a homosexual act in a public restroom
but no charges were pressed. The board filed a complaint but, based on
substantial testimony regarding his fitness as a teacher, the trial court
found in his favor.28 7 The appellate court reversed, however, holding
278. E.g., Board of Educ. v. Calderon, 35 Cal. App. 3d 490, 110 Cal. Rptr. 916 (1973),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 807 (1974) (teacher was dismissed after acquittal of charge of oral
copulation with another male. Held: the reasonable doubt standard of proof in criminal
trials does not apply to civil proceedings where the purpose is to protect children).
279. E.g., Pettit v. State Bd. of Educ., 10 Cal. 3d 29, 513 P.2d 889, 109 Cal. Rptr. 665
(1973). Pettit was arrested for committing three separate acts of oral copulation at a
"swinger's" party and charged with violating CAL. PENAL CODE § 288a (West Supp. 1972), a
crime enumerated in California's automatic disqualification statutes. The criminal charge
was dropped and Pettit pleaded guilty to CAL. PENAL CODE § 650 (outraging public de-
cency), a misdemeanor. See also Moser v. State Bd. of Educ., 22 Cal. App. 3d 988, 101 Cal.
Rptr. 86 (1972). Moser was convicted of offensive conduct, CAL. PENAL CODE § 415, but the
board found his acts constituted indecent exposure, loitering in a public toilet and solicita-
tion to engage in lewd conduct, id. at 990-91.
280. E.g., Board of Educ. v. Jack M., 19 Cal.3d 691, 566 P.2d 602, 139 Cal. Rptr. 700
(1977). Jack M. was arrested for lewd conduct in a public place, CAL. PENAL CODE § 647(a),
but no charges were filed.
281. 22 Cal. App. 3d 988, 101 Cal. Rptr. 86 (1972).
282. But see Amundson v. State Bd. of Educ., 2 Civ. No. 37942 (December 17, 1971), in
which the court found that a male teacher's act of soliciting two men, who later proved to be
police officers, for acts of oral copulation in a public park was not shown to affect his fitness
to teach. The Amundson court stressed that the teacher's conduct did not involve any stu-
dents or fellow teachers and did not take place anywhere near school grounds. For a discus-
sion of the relevancy of public versus private conduct, see Comment, Unfitness to Teach:
Credential Revocation and Dismissal for Sexual Conduct, 61 CAL. L. REv. 1442, 1452-55
(1973).
283. 36 Cal. App. 3d 546, 111 Cal. Rptr. 724 (1974). In Metca!f, illegally obtained evi-
dence concerning a teacher's act of oral copulation in a public restroom was held admissible
in the civil proceedings which led to his disqualification.
284. See text accompanying note 200 supra.
285. 36 Cal. App. 3d at 550, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 727.
286. 19 Cal. 3d 691, 566 P.2d 602, 139 Cal. Rptr. 700 (1977).
287. Id. at 696, 566 P.2d at 604, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 702.
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that the teacher's alleged criminal conduct evidenced unfitness as a
matter of law.2 8 Unanimously reversing the appellate court's ruling,
the supreme court held that "neither statute nor decisional authority
has applied a rule ofperse unfitness to persons who were not convicted
of specified sex offenses. 289 It noted that there was no evidence that
the teacher had failed to instruct his students in morals, or that he was
incapable of teaching. Moreover, extenuating circumstances might
have influenced him to behave atypically on the occasion in ques-
tion.290
The Jack M. decision should curb the predilection of some school
boards and lower courts to characterize homosexual conduct as
evidencingper se unfitness to teach. It should be noted, however, that
the "substantial evidence" test relied upon by Justice Tobriner in Jack
M.29 1 is not difficult to meet. Where a trial court, in contrast to that in
Jack M., finds sufficient evidence of unfitness, its determination will
probably be upheld.2 92 The reluctance of some courts to apply the
Morrison formulation may very well foreshadow its less than diligent
application in the future.
Jack M. was an attempt by the California Supreme Court to indi-
cate what grounds must satisfy Morrison's nexus requirement to war-
rant employment disqualification. But the problems inherent in
determining whether a teacher's dismissal comports with the require-
ments of due process are not solved merely by recognizing that the
Morrison analysis applies, since Morrison simply listed the numerous
factors to be considered in such a determination. 93 The scope of these
problems will be explored below.
3. Problems in the Application of Morrison
One recurring problem in cases which do apply the Morrison crite-
ria is that courts are free to weigh some factors heavily while omitting
consideration of others entirely. How these factors are weighed may, in
fact, turn upon the personal prejudices of a particular court, defeating
the goal of Morrison. Thus, in Pettit v. State Board of Education,2 94 a
288. Board of Educ. v. Millette, 133 Cal. Rptr. 275 (1976), vacated sub nom. Board of
Educ. v. Jack M., 19 Cal. 3d 691, 566 P.2d 602, 139 Cal. Rptr. 700 (1977).
289. 19 Cal. 3d at 699, 566 P.2d at 606, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 704. The court reaffirmed the
principle that trial court findings, if supported by substantial evidence, will be upheld on
appeal.
290. Id. at 700, 566 P.2d at 607, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 705. The homosexual solicitation was
characterized as an isolated act of aggressive behavior by one of an otherwise passive sexual
disposition, precipitated by an unusual amount of stress due to his mother's illness.
291. Id. at 696-700, 566 P.2d at 604-07, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 702-05.
292. See note 289 supra.
293. See text accompanying note 200 supra.
294. 10 Cal. 3d 29, 513 P.2d 889, 109 Cal. Rptr. 665 (1973). See note 279 supra.
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teacher's credential revocation was upheld on the basis of her sexual
misconduct. The court found that the "expert testimony" of three
school administrators was sufficient to establish unfitness, even though
their opinions might have been based in part on personal moral
views.2 95 As Pettit illustrates, a hostile school board or trial court may
virtually disregard expert testimony regarding the non-probability of
recurrence, the lack of effect on students and any remoteness in time or
absence of actual public knowledge of a teacher's conduct.296 Corre-
spondingly, a board's perception of the "blameworthiness of the mo-
tives surrounding the conduct ' 297 or "aggravating circumstances" 298
may be disproportionately emphasized.
Another problem stems from the fact that the factors enunciated in
Morrison are subject to varying interpretation. What might appear to
one adjudicative body as an "extenuating circumstance" might appear
an "aggravating circumstance" to another.299 If homosexuality is per-
295. 10 Cal. 3d at 35, 513 P.2d at 893, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 669. The court stated: "Even
without expert testimony, the board was entitled to conclude that plaintiff's flagrant display
indicated a serious defect of moral character, normal prudence and good common sense."
Id.
For a discussion of school administrators as "experts" in teacher disqualification hear-
ings, see Willemsen, Sex and the School Teacher, 14 SANTA CLARA LAW. 839 (1974); Note,
Pettit v. State Board of Educ.-Out-of-Classroom Sexual Misconduct as Groundsfor Revoca-
tion of Teaching Credentials, 1973 UTAH L. REv. 797.
Justice Tobriner, dissenting in Pettit, stated that the "important issue of plaintif's right
to teach should not turn on the personal distaste of judges." 10 Cal. 3d at 41, 513 P.2d at
898, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 674 (Tobriner, J., dissenting). Furthermore, he noted that Pettit's
duties did not include teaching sexual morality to her retarded pupils. Id. at 41-42, 513 P.2d
at 898, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 674.
296. Id. at 42-43, 513 P.2d at 898-99, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 674-75 (Tobriner, J., dissenting).
297. See, e.g., Governing Bd. v. Brennan, 18 Cal. App. 3d 396, 95 Cal. Rptr. 712 (1971).
Brennan, a teacher for thirty years, submitted an affidavit attesting to her almost daily pri-
vate use of marijuana in support of a friend's motion in arrest of judgment. The affidavit
was publicized, but no evidence was offered as to its effect on students. The court empha-
sized the "blameworthiness" aspect of her conduct, the intentional violation of the law to
which Brennan attested in a public statement, but it omitted any consideration of Brennan's
teaching record. Justification for dismissal was based on the likely effect her conduct would
have on the students, rather than any actual effect. Contra, Comings v. State Bd. of Educ.,
23 Cal. App. 3d 94, 100 Cal. Rptr. 73 (1972), where the court found that the record showed
no evidence of whether Comings' conviction for marijuana possession had affected his stu-
dents, therefore he could not be found unfit to teach.
298. See, e.g., Pettit v. State Bd. of Educ., 10 Cal. 3d 29, 35, 513 P.2d 889, 893, 109 Cal.
Rptr. 665, 669 (1973). Although the majority in Pettit did not employ the term "aggravating
circumstances" in this case, its repeated emphasis on Pettit's semi-public display of sexual
conduct involving three different men suggested that the court's outrage precluded impartial
consideration of other factors.
299. See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Jack M., 19 Cal. 3d 691,695, 566 P.2d 602, 603, 139 Cal.
Rptr. 700, 701 (1977). At the time of his alleged homosexual solicitation in a restroom, the
teacher was experiencing stress over the illness of his mother. The school principal testified
that Jack M.'s alleged conduct demonstrated improper reaction to stress and pressure, and
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sonally abhorrent to members of the reviewing court, it is likely that
they will anticipate a high degree of adverse impact upon students due
to a teacher's homosexual conduct, even though that conduct may
never become known to the students.3 °° Since there is such a "wide
divergence of views on sexual morality" 31 the fairness of permitting a
school board or court to assess the "praiseworthiness or blameworthi-
ness of the motives resulting in the conduct" 3 2 is questionable. And if
a teacher is distressed by the knowledge that a colleague has engaged in
homosexual conduct, an "adverse effect on fellow teachers" could read-
fly be found, as was the case in Gaylord.°3
A third problem is that both Mforrison and Jack .4f stressed the
that she was not willing to take the risk of recurrence. It would appear that Jack M.'s stress
was, if anything, an aggravating factor in the decision to disqualify him. The trial court,
however, viewed M.'s accumulated stress as an extenuating factor.
300. See e.g., McLaughlin v. Board of Medical Examiners, 35 Cal. App. 3d 1010, 1018-
19, 111 Cal. Rptr. 353 359-60 (1973) (Kaus, P.J., dissenting). Although this case involved the
disciplining of a physician accused of homosexual solicitation in a restroom, the dissenting
opinion's analysis illuminates the effect of inveterate prejudice on the evidence-weighing
process and is, perhaps, applicable to cases involving gay teachers: "What this court is really
doing is to substitute a visceral feeling that the medical achievement of a homosexual doctor
must be affected by his sex drive-at least with respect to male patients-for evidence that
this is so in this particular case. Thus there is nothing whatever in the record to support the
court's statement that 'appellant's problem apparently stays with him most, if not all of the
time. . . .' The fact is, however, that there is no evidence that appellant has ever faltered in
connection with his profession." Id.
See also L. HUMPHREYS, THE TEAROOM TRADE: IMPERSONAL SEX IN PUBLIC PLACES
(1975). This doctoral dissertation describes the clientele of public restroom encounters-
many of whom are basically heterosexual-and the etiquette surrounding such experiences.
According to Humphreys' research, most of such encounters take place at carefully chosen,
out-of-the-way facilities which are unlikely to be frequented by passersby, but which are
known meeting places where casual sex is available. Many of the men he observed were
extremely cautious in finding partners and had elaborate warning systems to avoid being
surprised by the public.
301. Pettit v. State Bd. of Educ., 10 Cal. 3d 29, 43, 513 P.2d 889, 899, 109 Cal. Rptr. 665,
675 (1973) (Tobriner, J., dissenting).
302. Morrison v. State Bd. of Educ., I Cal. 3d 214, 229, 461 P.2d 375. 386, 82 Cal. Rptr.
175, 186 (1969) (footnote omitted). The court discussed the emotional, financial and marital
difficulties of Morrison's partner, which might suggest that the court discerned an altruistic
motive to Morrison's actions. id. at 218-19, 461 P.2d at 377-78, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 177-78.
303. Gaylord v. Tacoma School Dist. No. 10, 88 Wash. 2d 286, 559 P,2d 1340, 1346, cer.
denied, 434 U.S. 879 (1977). See notes 250-57 and accompanying text supra. Three teachers
objected to Gaylord's continued employment, which apparently had a degree of influence
on the court. See note 256 and accompanying text supra. The .largest teacher's union in
California has adopted a policy which states in part: "The professional staff shall be em-
ployed and retained without discrimination because of race, color, creed, sex, national ori-
gin, marital status, political or religious beliefs, family, social or cultural background, social
or economic belief, or sexual orientation." [Emphasis added]. CALIFORNIA TEACHERS As-
SOC., POLICY STATEMENT ON ACADEMIC FREEDOM (adopted by the State Council of Educ.,
Jan., 1977). This suggests that in California, the majority of teachers favor employment
protection for their gay peers.
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isolated nature of the conduct at issue.3" The conclusion which might
be drawn is that an asexual, or very repressed, individual who "slips"
under the pressure of exigent circumstances is more deserving of em-
ployment protection than a teacher who is open about his or her gay
orientation, perhaps living in a stable, long-term relationship. The va-
lidity of this rationale is questionable in light of research which indi-
cates that gays who openly acknowledge their orientation tend to be
better adjusted than those who conceal or deny their homosexuality." 5
Moreover, this same rationale, if applied to heterosexual conduct,
would be reminiscent of the days when married women were not per-
mitted to teach, an atavism which would contravene notions of contem-
porary justice and mores.
According to the Morrison decision, notoriety which might impair
classroom efficiency could furnish cause for dismissal.306 This loophole
would permit teacher disqualification in California under the facts
presented in Gaylord,3 "7 Acanfora, °s Gish'h, 3 0 9 Aumiller310 and Bur-
ton,3 1' since each of these teachers had arguably attained some degree
of notoriety. In Burton and Gaylord, public awareness of the teacher's
sexual preference had not even been engendered by any conduct of the
teacher, but had instead been promulgated by the school board. Yet in
none of these cases was there even a suggestion of criminal conduct,
improper behavior with students or dereliction in teaching duties. One
commentator has noted that school administrators seeking to justify
disqualification of a teacher for notoriety may be simply voicing their
own disapproval of the teacher's conduct.31 2 Yet this is the precise due
process problem that Morrison sought to avoid.31 3
The publicity aspects noted in Morrison and Jack M raise another
issue not yet dealt with by the California Supreme Court: where pub-
licity arises from a gay teacher's political and educational efforts, as in
304. See notes 199 & 290 and accompanying text supra.
305. See NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF MENTAL HEALTH TASK FORCE ON HOMOSEXUALITY:
FINAL REPORT AND BACKGROUND PAPERS (1972). The latest Kinsey Institute study indi-
cates that on the whole, gay lifestyles vary much as do heterosexual lifestyles. The study
suggests that gays are not, in general, anxiety-ridden as is usually believed, and that those
who are involved in monogamous relationships might be even better adjusted and happier
than their heterosexual counterparts. Charting the Gay Lfe, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 27, 1978, at
98-100, reporting on A. BELL & M. WEINBERG, HOMOSEXUALITIES: A STUDY OF DIVERSITY
AMONG MEN & WOMEN (1978).
306. See note 202 and accompanying text supra.
307. See notes 250-58 and accompanying text supra.
308. See notes 223 & 224 and accompanying text supra.
309. See notes 260-62 and accompanying text supra.
310. See notes 140-44 and accompanying text supra.
311. See notes 134-35 and accompanying text supra.
312. Comment: Unfitness to Teach: CredentialRevocation and Dismissalfor Sexual Con-
duct, 61 CAL. L. REv. 1442, 1454 (1973).
313. See notes 195-97 and accompanying text supra.
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Acanfora, Gish and Aumiller, the doctrine of unconstitutional condi-
tions should weigh heavily against dismissal for notoriety." 4 In fact,
no California case has squarely addressed the question of balancing a
gay teacher's right to free expression against the state's interest in regu-
lating speech that might interfere with the efficiency of the school dis-
trict. This problem merits closer analysis to determine how the
mandates of Pickering,315 protecting teachers' speech and associational
rights, might apply to the off-duty activities of teachers. Since notori-
ety, or even public awareness, concerning a teacher's sexual conduct is
thought to interfere with his or her ability to function as a teacher, this
justification could be offered to excuse any "chilling" of First Amend-
ment rights.
While many issues remain unresolved in California after Morri-
son, the decision at least reflects a more careful and objective analysis
of the constitutional rights of gay teachers than has been found in ei-
ther federal or other state courts. But as indicated, much is left to be
clarified. In the final section, an attempt will be made to delineate ex-
actly what criteria should, and should not, play a role in determining
whether a homosexual teacher is fit for his or her profession.
IV. Toward More Effective Standards of Substantive Fairness
Procedural safeguards in the context of employment disqualifica-
tion are important, but if the substantive standards against which
teachers are measured are subjective, procedural protection is illusory.
Moral judgments are by their nature subjective. Conduct or status of
which a segment of the population disapproves may have no demon-
strable effect on employment performance, other than that arising from
community censure. In such cases, the nexus between conduct and un-
fitness for employment would be at best fashioned from subjective cri-
teria and virtually non-existent. In order to avoid the operation of
subjective criteria, the primary concerns of administrative boards in as-
sessing the fitness of teachers should be the educational competence of
the teacher and the possibility of actual harm to students resulting from
the teacher's conduct. Ultimately, state legislatures and courts should
promulgate and ensure the application of objective criteria to teacher
disqualification.
A. Educational Competence
A teacher's ability to function effectively in the classroom is a
proper focus of inquiry in judging fitness. One component of a
teacher's effectiveness is the capacity to maintain adequate discipline, a
314. See notes 68-91 and accompanying text su.pra.
315. See notes 83-88 and accompanying text supra.
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task which is usually best achieved when students respect and want to
pleas,. their teacher.316 If a teacher's sexual conduct seriously under-
mines the respect he or she gains from the students, a finding of unfit-
ness could be justified. This might occur if students observe a teacher's
public sexual behavior or if publicity calls attention to a teacher's arrest
for such conduct. Even in these cases, however, the effect of notoriety
should be examined realistically to determine whether its long-range
consequences warrant ousting an otherwise capable teacher. The event
might engender only a brief flurry of comment from students or par-
ents, but many courts assume that public knowledge of a teacher's un-
conventional sexual conduct will obliterate whatever goodwill and
respect he or she has earned through years of competent teaching. 17
The teacher may be able to restore classroom order promptly so that
the educational process is not impaired, and it would seem reasonable
for adminsitrative boards to allow a brief period of time for this to take
place.
In addition to a teacher's ability to maintain order in the class-
room, a school board should also assign considerable weight to his or
her skill in facilitating the learning process. Yet only rarely is the qual-
ity of a teacher's work even considered when he or she is under scrutiny
for unconventional sexual behavior. In some instances, the revelation
of a teacher's homosexuality is so damaging that even a demonstrated
record of excellence in the profession may pale, as it did in Gaylord.311
The ultimate losers, in such a case, may very well be the pupils, since
they are deprived of a well-qualified instructor for reasons unconnected
with his or her teaching ability.
School boards frequently cite a teacher's inability to act as "moral
exemplar" for pupils to furnish evidence of unfitness. 319 A teacher's
ability to instruct students, even by example, on sexual morality should
not be examined. Rather, inquiries should focus on whether a teacher
advocates or imposes on students his or her own view of sexual moral-
ity. It is inconceivable that a conventionally heterosexual teacher
would be investigated for his or her ability to instruct students on how
to "grow up straight," since this is not the job of a modem school
teacher. As Justice Tobriner noted in his dissent in Pettit: "[The] view
that teachers in their private lives should exemplify Victorian principles
of sexual morality, and in the classroom should subliminally indoctri-
nate the pupils in such principles, is hopelessly unrealistic and atavis-
tic."' 3 0 To dismiss a gay teacher for his inability to accomplish the
316. See S. WEBSTER, DISCIPLINE IN THE CLASSROOM, 36, 60-61 (1968).
317. See notes 251 & 256 and accompanying text supra.
318. See notes 250-58 and accompanying text supra.
319. See, e.g., Pettit v. State Bd. of Educ., 10 Cal.3d 29, 36, 513 P.2d 889, 894, 109 Cal.
Rptr. 665, 670 (1973).
320. Id. at 44, 513 P.2d at 899, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 675 (Tobriner, J., dissenting).
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"unrealistic and atavistic"32' would therefore be patently unfair.
B. Actual Harm
In addition to focusing on realistic educational goals, an adminis-
trative board's scrutiny should be directed toward the possibility of ac-
tual harm resulting from a teacher's behavior. Where a teacher's
conduct is directed at children, it should undoubtedly be cause for dis-
qualification. 322 There is, however, little basis for assuming that be-
cause a teacher has engaged in unorthodox sexual conduct with adults,
a similar likelihood exists for misconduct with students.323 Yet this as-
sumption may underly the reasoning of some boards and courts.324
Another possibility of "harm" which is often relied upon as a justi-
fication for a teacher's disqualification is the relationship between a
teacher's sexual orientation and the sexual development of his or her
students. Researchers have not yet established any such cause and ef-
fect relationship or lack thereof. Indeed, it may not be possible to de-
termine whether a teacher's sexual preference significantly affects the
sexual development of his or her students, but contemporary research
indicates that sexual orientation is fixed before most children enter
321. Id.
322. Eg., Hankla v. Governing Bd., 46 Cal. App. 3d 644, 120 Cal. Rptr. 827 (1975)
(school principal who fondled a male student was criminally charged and placed on imme-
diate compulsory leave of absence pursuant to dismissal proceedings); Board of Trustees v.
Stubblefield, 16 Cal. App. 3d 820, 940 Cal. Rptr. 318 (1971) (junior college teacher was
found partially nude in a parked car with a female student and attempted to flee from dep-
uty sheriff); Weissman v. Board of Educ., 547 P.2d 1267 (Colo. 1976) (teacher supervising
field trip engaged in suggestive horseplay with female students); Denton v. South Kitsap
School Dist. No. 402, 10 Wash. App. 69, 516 P.2d 1080 (1973) (teacher discharged because of
sexual relations with a minor student who became pregnant). An instructor's sexual activity
with a mature student, while it may not inflict actual harm upon the student, may raise the
additional problem of a teacher's requiring sexual favors in exchange for good grades. See,
e.g., N.Y. Times, Aug. 22, 1977, at 30, col. I, reporting on suit fied by women students
charging Yale University faculty with engaging in sexually offensive conversations and be-
havior. Apart from the infliction of actual harm, a strong possibility of future harm to
schoolchildren may be sufficient evidence upon which to predicate a teacher's disqualifica-
tion. See, e.g., Alford v. Department of Educ., 13 Cal. App. 3d 884, 91 Cal. Rptr. 843 (1970)
(psychiatric testimony furnished substantial evidence that teacher suffering from mental ill-
ness was unfit to teach).
323. One researcher found that the prototypical child molester is a previously heterosex-
ually-oriented man, aged 35-50, who is no longer experiencing heterosexual relations. The
exclusively homosexual individual whose attention is focused on adults is hardly ever a
danger to children. M. SCHOFIELD, SOCIOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF HOMOSEXUALITY 149, 155
(1965). Accord, GREAT BRITAIN, COMMITTEE ON HOMOSEXUAL OFFENSES AND PROSTITU-
TION, THE WOLFENDEN REPORT 45-46 (Amer. ed. 1963); E. SCHUR, CRIfES WITHOUT VIC-
TIMS 74 (1965).
324. The allusions to "harm" in opinions such as Gaylord suggest a concern with some-
thing more than the emotional impact of a teacher's sexual unorthodoxy noted in Grossman.
See note 255 supra.
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school.325 Such generalized and unsubstantiated hypotheses of harm,
therefore, do not provide fair criteria for a teacher's disqualification.
C. Ensuring Objective Criteria
Without guidance from the Supreme Court as to what employ-
ment standards are constitutional, most state legislatures have adopted
statutory schemes governing employment disqualification which leave
excessive room for judgments based on subjective notions of morality.
Ideally, any loopholes should be closed by additional legislation. This
could be done by amending education codes to indicate that: (1) pri-
vate, consensual sexual conduct may not be considered as evidence of
"immorality" or unfitness to teach, (2) public knowledge of a teacher's
private conduct may not, by itself, furnish cause for disqualification,
and (3) teachers may not be disqualified for engaging in out-of-class-
room conduct otherwise protected under the First Amendment.326 It is
unlikely that legislatures will undertake this task on their own initia-
tive, risking public disapproval; however, as shown by the history lead-
ing to revision of the civil service regulations, a push from the judiciary
may result in administrative or legislative reevaluation of the underly-
ing policies.327 If, as is contended here, existing policies result in the
arbitrary disqualification of gay teachers and other gay public employ-
ees, there should be no bar to judicial review of the constitutionality of
such policies.328
Aside from judicial interpretation of federal guarantees or legisla-
tive revision of education codes, a third-and perhaps more effective-
source for protecting the rights of gay teachers lies in state constitu-
tions. The California Constitution, for example, contains an explicit
right to privacy.329 Moreover, the California judiciary has recognized
that the "right to practice one's profession is sufficiently precious to
surround it with a panoply of legal protection," 330 and, through the
325. J. MONEY & A. EHRHARDT, MAN AND WOMAN, BOY AND GIRL 23 (1972).
326. This approach would track, to some extent, the revised civil service regulations. See
notes 180 & 181 and accompanying text supra.
327. It will be recalled that the civil service regulations were revised only after a federal
district court issued an injunction against enforcement of the old regulations. Society for
Individual Rights, Inc. v. Hampton, 63 F.R.D. 399 (N.D. Cal. 1973). See notes 177-79 and
accompanying text supra.
328. As the district court pointed out in Acanfora: "While a court must necessarily bear
a sense of proportion with respect to precedent and social mores, a rigidly restrictive theory
of [constitutional] interpretation, avoiding the dangers of judicial activism, is open to criti-
cism for abdication of the duty to expound the Constitution." Acanfora v. Board of Educ.,
359 F. Supp. 843, 850 (D. Md. 1973), ar4d on other grounds, 491 F.2d 498 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 836 (1974).
329. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1.
330. Yakov v. Board of Medical Examiners, 68 Cal. 2d 67, 75, 435 P.2d 553, 559, 64 Cal.
Rptr. 785, 791 (1968).
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AMorrison and Jack M. decisions, it has attempted to ensure that teach-
ers accused of immorality are not dismissed without a "careful and rea-
soned" inquiry into their fitness. 331 These factors, coupled with the fact
that California, as many other states, no longer regards private consen-
sual homosexual acts as criminal,332 suggest a state objective of main-
taining the separation between purely private concerns and those which
truly affect the welfare of the public.
If presented the opportunity, the California Supreme Court should
consider the possibility that the state constitution precludes employ-
ment disqualification for private homosexual activities or conduct di-
rected toward attaining equality of rights for homosexuals. It may be
argued that the United States Supreme Court has affirmatively refused
to recognize constitutional protection for affectional preference. 333
Ample precedent exists, however, for the protection of individual rights
under the California Constitution to an extent even greater than that
required by the Federal Constitution.334 To this end, judicial clarifica-
tion is needed on the question of whether the application of subjective
moral criteria to decisions concerning employment disqualification of-
fends the state constitution. Only with such guidance will the gaps left
open by Morrison, permitting arbitrary evaluations of teacher fitness,
335
be filled.
331. Morrison v. State Bd. of Educ., 1 Cal. 3d 214, 238-39, 461 P.2d 375, 394, 82 Cal.
Rptr. 175, 194 (1969).
332. See note 100 and accompanying text supra.
333. See Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 403 F. Supp. 1199 (ED. Va. 1975), affd
mem., 425 U.S. 901 (1976). Affectional preference concerns those rights which have been
found implicit in the Constitution in other contexts, such as the right to privacy and the right
to exercise control over one's own body. As previously noted, the Supreme Court has de-
clined to apply these developing rights to issues concerning homosexual conduct. See notes
99-111 and accompanying text supra. Even less helpful is the Court's silence on questions
involving First Amendment rights and the "unconstitutional conditions" on employment
problems. Gay employees, particularly teachers, are left without notice as to what conduct
may preclude them from jobs; writing a letter to the local newspaper concerning gay rights,
marching in a gay rights parade, attending meetings of activist organizations or signing a
petition in support of gay rights could all conceivably subject a teacher to disqualification.
Yet most people would defend a teacher's right to engage in any of those activities.
334. Compare People v. Disbrow, 16 Cal. 3d 101,545 P.2d 272, 127 Cal. Rptr. 360 (1976)
with Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971); Sail'er Inn v. Kirby, 5 Cal. 3d 1,485 P.2d 529,
95 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1971) with Fronteiro v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973); Serrano v. Priest,
18 Cal. 3d 728, 557 P.2d 929, 135 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1976) with San Antonio School Dist. v.
Rodrigues, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). See also Note, Rediscovering the California Declaration of
Rights, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 481 (1974). Another state where this argument could be made is
Alaska, where a state constitutional right to privacy has already been interpreted to protect
adult individuals' possession of marijuana at home for personal use. Ravin v. State, 537
P.2d 494 (Alas. 1975).
335. See notes 274-315 and accompanying text supra.
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Conclusion
A review of the history of employment of gay individuals illus-
trates the effect public prejudice has had upon the due process safe-
guards to which they, as citizens, are entitled. Modem research and
practical experience suggest that such opprobrium is unwarranted and
even detrimental to society, but discriminatory treatment of gays' em-
ployment rights is still evident in the case law. Although the Supreme
Court has failed to address this issue directly, the imprimatur of the
Doe decision336 implies that gay employment rights will not be ac-
corded any protection under the Federal Constitution.
California has taken a step toward curtailing arbitrary enforce-
ment of state dismissal and licensing codes against gay teachers, and
other public employees and licensees, through the Morrison and Jack
M. decisions.337 The opportunity remains, however, for school boards
and trial courts to apply their own subjective standards of morality to
evaluations of teacher fitness.338 The recent California campaign to
mandate disqualification of gay teachers, which raised for many the
spectre of anti-gay "witch-hunts, '339 illuminates the need for employ-
ment safeguards based on fair standards.
This comment has attempted to show that any morally-based dis-
qualification of teachers for conduct which is private and consensual,
or which is otherwise protectible under the First Amendment, offends
due process because it is patently arbitrary. The United States
Supreme Court's avoidance of cases posing due process problems in
disqualification of gay employees does not preclude state supreme
court recognition of employment protection under the state constitu-
tion. If the legislature has failed to ensure that disqualification proce-
dures adequately protect individuals' constitutional rights, the state
supreme court should act. As expressed by Judge Lumbard, dissenting
in Burton v. Cascade School District:
One of the major purposes of the Constitution is to protect indi-
viduals from the tyranny of the majority. That purpose would be
completely subverted if we allowed the feelings of the majority to
determine the remedies available to a member of a minority
group who has been the victim of unconstitutional actions.340
336. Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975), aff'dmem.,
425 U.S. 901 (1976). See notes 99-104 and acompanying text supra.
337. See notes 191-200 and 286-90 and accompanying text supra.
338. See notes 294-313 and accompanying text supra.
339. For another illustration of the witchhunt analogy, see J. GERAssI, THE BOYS OF
BOISE: FUROR, VICE AND FOLLY IN AN AMERICAN CITy (1968), a chronicle of a mod-
ern-day (1955) witchhunt which sent many gay residents of Boise to prison.
340. 512 F.2d 850, 855-56 (9th Cir. 1975) (Lumbard, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
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